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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 - Topic
The following thesis is an analysis of how transnational advocacy networks seek political influence 
in the United Nations, based on a case study of the ongoing campaign for an Arms Trade Treaty, 
Control Arms (2003-). 
In  the  last  decades  the notion that  the  primary actors  in  the international  system are  the 
sovereign states, has become a significant debate in international relations.1 Categorically, there are 
two sides to this debate, namely the empirical question of how much influence non-state actors have 
upon international relations,  and the normative one which asks how much influence they should 
have.2 This thesis will contribute to this debate by addressing a more narrow question in the former 
category,  namely  the  question  of  how non-state  actors  try  to  influence  international  politics. 
Specifically, I will look at the three leading non-governmental organizations in an international civil 
network – Amnesty International, Oxfam International and IANSA – and their work in promoting an 
Arms Trade Treaty at the UN. 
1.2 – Background 
The Control Arms Campaign focuses on the international trade in arms, arguing that lack of controls 
on the arms trade is fuelling conflict, poverty and human rights abuses; the goal of the NGOs in this 
regard is to build support among governments for a global, legally binding treaty that will prohibit  
arms from being exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit human rights 
violations.  Such a treaty would require  countries to comply with international human rights and 
humanitarian law standards when authorizing weapons transfers. 
Regarding  the  NGOs,  the  International  Action  Network  on  Small  Arms  (IANSA)  is  an 
organization which essentially acts  as coordinating office for 800 national and international civil 
organizations focused around the topic of gun proliferation and misuse.3 Oxfam International is a 
confederation of 14 regional civil organizations dealing with sustainable development related issues.4 
Amnesty International is a global NGO centered around human rights.5 All three are recognized by 
the  United  Nations  as  NGOs.6 Both  the  informants  and  the  textual  sources  used  in  this  thesis 
originate from the international secretariats of these NGOs, which are located in Oxford (Oxfam) and 
1 Compare Willetts (2001:426), Colás (2002:3-4), Bas Arts (1998:24)
2 Example in Colás (2002:5). 
3 Source: http://www.iansa.org/about.htm 
4 Source: http://www.oxfam.org/en/about 
5 Source: http://www.amnesty.org/ 
6 Source: http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/index.asp 
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London (AI, IANSA). 
While the three NGOs started their work on the ATT in 2003, it was first addressed officially 
in the UN in December 2006, at which time the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89 
“Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export 
and transfer of conventional arms”.7 This thesis will focus on the time-line of 2008-2009, within 
which there have been two Open-Ended Working Groups on the ATT, in Mars and July of 2009, as 
well as two meetings of the First Committee, which is in October/November every year after the 
General Assembly General Debate. These are the main events for the NGOs that are working on the 
ATT, as  confirmed by informants.  Additionally,  the UN Secretary General  appointed a  group of 
governmental experts to meet and discuss the ATT three times in 2008. Final negotiations on the ATT 
are scheduled for 2012.
Informants describe the complex structure of the Control Arms campaign as two structures 
imposed on top  of  each other,  the  campaign having  been originally  set  up  by the  three  largest 
organizations, Oxfam, AI and IANSA, and then having been broadened to include other NGOs along 
the way. This second and bigger constellation of NGOs is referred to as the Arms Trade Treaty 
Steering Committee (ATT SC), and consists  of 16-18 NGOs working together on the ATT.8 The 
number is unfixed, informants explain, as it varies who will participate and who will sign on to the 
different reports and policy documents. While the three larger NGOs handle most of the campaigning 
under the banner of the Control Arms logo, the ATT SC will guide the policy and set the direction of  
the ATT campaign. The Control Arms campaign is self-governing, and in terms of being a brand it 
represents only the three larger NGOs, but it will naturally overlap with the broader ATT campaign. 
Most  informants  claimed  that  the  Control  Arms  NGOs  are  more  influential  in  determining  the 
direction of the ATT related work.9  
1.3 – Problem and research questions
The theoretical foundations of this study can be described as a response to theory on international 
society, otherwise known as the English School of international relations. In uniting the opposing 
perspectives of neorealism and neoliberalism, the English School of international relations theory 
kept the notion from realism of states as primary actors in what they call international society, a view 
7 Source: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/499/77/PDF/N0649977.pdf?OpenElement 
8   The Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee will often include: the Africa Peace Forum, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human 
Progress, Caritas Internationalis, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Instituto Sou da Paz, Nonviolence International,  Project 
Ploughshares, Saferworld, Schweitzer Institute, Viva Rio, Women's Institute for Alternative Development,   Source: 
http://armstradetreaty.org/att/aboutus.php  
9 According to inf #2, it is the ATT SC that makes the biggest decisions with regard to the direction of the campaign, but inf #1-3 and 
#5 agree that, for various reasons, the three largest NGOs have a bit more influence in the SC. Whenever some, but not all, 
informants are referred to, this does not imply that the othes disagree (unless specified), but merely that not all informants were 
asked; interviews 4-6 were much shorter than 1-3. 
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that has been prevalent in international relations over the last decades (Colás 2002:2). Put simply, the 
view is that since there is no super-state to police the dealings of individual states, realism portrays  
this  sphere as anarchic;  international society theory,  on the other hand, maintains that while this 
description has merits, the international sphere is better characterized as a society wherein members – 
at least to an extent – follow rules and expectations.10 The theory that is used in this thesis, notably 
that of Colás (2002), Bas Arts (1998) and Keck and Sikkink (1999), argue that conventional theory 
on international society lacks an understanding of the agency and influence of non-state actors in 
international relations. 
The debate on state-centric theory serves as a backdrop to the question in this thesis. In order 
for the question of whether  non-state  actors should be considered players  alongside states  to be 
answered, it must be preceded by an understanding of how,  and the conditions under which, civil 
actors operate. This study does not attempt to measure the extent of their political influence, nor does 
it purport to settle the overarching debate on state-centrism. The interrogative problem statement is: 
How  do  transnational  advocacy  networks  seek  to  influence  international  politics?  Derivative 
research questions are what their access to the arena is and whether they are received as legitimate 
actors, what kind of obstacles they encounter in the different stages of the process and what strategies 
they use to overcome them. Ultimately, the aim of this study is to gain a more clear understanding of  
the nature of their political influence in the international arena. 
Specifically, this is a single-case case study using qualitative methods, and the strategy is to 
match the data collected from informants and internal documents with recent theory on the matter, to 
see if it is congruent or if the data can tell us something new. In doing this, I rely heavily on my 
informants,  on the one hand, and on recent  NGO-specific  theory on the other.  Findings will  be 
somewhat  limited  by the reliance on informants  and by the  narrow scope of  the time-line.  The 
purpose is descriptive and aimed at understanding different types of political influence and, as such, 
the study is not aimed at causal explanation.  
 1.4 – The structure of the study 
Chapter 2 will present and discuss the theoretical concepts of the study, focusing on the arena in 
which the actors operate,  the concepts of political  influence and regimes,  as well  as the general 
characteristics of transnational advocacy networks. The operational concepts will center around a 
typology of political influence as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998/1999). Chapter 3 will explain 
the methodological choices underlining this study, including problems related to field-work, the use 
of sources, validity, reliability and bias. 
10 Jackson and Sørensen (2007:132)
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In chapter 4, the gathered data will be presented an analyzed in relation to the theoretical 
concepts. The aim of this chapter is to show how the network operates, their access to the arena in 
question and the challenges they face. The last and most extensive part of chapter four will deal with 
the typology of political influence as presented in chapter 2. Chapter 5 will highlight the results of 
matching the theory with the gathered data, to see what is congruent and what is anomalous; this will  
be discussed with regard to theoretical implications as well as validity, reliability and relevance to the 
field. 
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Chapter 2 – Theory
The following chapter will discuss the theoretical foundations of this study, starting with the debate 
on the role of non-state actors in international relations and on state-centrism in the traditional theory 
on international society (2.1). The central concepts of the study will then be defined, with emphasis 
on arena (2.2.1), political influence (2.2.2), regimes/treaties (2.2.3) and actor characteristics (2.2.4). 
Lastly,  the  concept  of  political  influence  will  be  broken down into  operational  concepts  for  the 
analysis chapter, using elements from regime theory, negotiation theory and NGO specific theory 
(2.3). The primary focus will be on NGO-specific theory and research, and while some elements 
from regime and negotiation theory will be used, these are downplayed  in favor of theory that is  
focused specifically on the agency of non-state actors.11 
2.1 - International Society, state-centrism, international civil society
The state-centric view in international relations is especially prevalent in neorealism, such as Waltz' 
balance-of-power theory (1979/1986). This theory subscribes to a structural version of the familiar 
doctrine of realism,  namely that  in  the absence of system-wide authority,  i.e.  a  superstate  or  its 
equivalent,  law and order  can  only be found on a  national  level.  So the  central  problem in his 
definition  of  structure  is  to ascertain  what  kind  of  law-like  patterns  one  can  devise  from  the 
seemingly  lawless  anarchy  that  dominates  the  international  system;  and,  from  there,  construct 
predictive  statements  about  favourable  structures.12 Waltz  is  firm  on  the  topic  of  what  should 
constitute  a  unit  in  the  international  system,  disregarding  NGOs  and  other  transnational  actors 
because, writes Waltz, when 'the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate' 
(Waltz,  1986:89).  He  paints  a  picture  of  international  relations  as  consisting  of  states  working 
mechanically to ensure their own survival, in what is ultimately a self-help system. Admitting that 
this is an oversimplification, he nevertheless insists that it  is a useful one, and that 'survival is a 
prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have' (1986:85). 
As discussed in the introduction,  aspects of the description of the international sphere as 
anarchic is  retained in the English School  of  international  relations.  This  anarchy,  however,  still 
constitutes a  society, in as much as the relationship between states is  characterized by rules and 
11 The two-fold reason for this is, firstly, the complex nature of influence exerted by actors which are not formally recognized 
as parties to a negotiation, and secondly, for reasons of scope (partly because the NGO-specific theory already draws on many of the  
relevant aspects from regime- and negotiation theory, which would result in overlap). These theories, when applied to a setting such as 
the UN, would fit the point of view of states more than it would NGOs. 
12 Unlike classical realism, the structural theory of Waltz need not assume any inherent quality in mankind, or even in political  
leaders. While structural realism is often compared to behaviouralism and subjected to similar lines of criticism, the comparison fails  
on the central point of assumptions about the human condition; this theory is not inherently reductive of human nature. Waltz must,  
however, make an assumption about the behaviour of units. His assumption is that units, or states, seek to ensure their survival, and  
that any other goals they might have are derivative. 
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expectations which – though they may be broken – are still acknowledged by states in general. While 
this treads a fine line between the polarity of neorealism and neoliberalism, it still leaves little room 
for  transnational  societies  of  international  corporations  and NGOs,  whose  roles  are  downplayed 
significantly.  In  operating  in  the  space  between  the  three  concepts  of  realism,  rationalism  and 
revolutionism, the English School purports to explain international society in a thorough manner – 
philosophically, historically and juridically, as well as descriptively and normatively – through an 
analysis of it's actors (Wight 1991:7-8).  The downside, of course, is the confusion and lack of clarity 
arising from combining several perspectives, and the oft criticized omission of political economy.13 
More important, in the context of this paper, is the recently rising criticism against the state centric 
view. 
In  his  book,  International  Civil  Society,  Alejandro  Colás  argues  for  the  relevance  of 
'voluntary, non-state, collective social and political agency' in international relations. He defines civil 
society as the social domain 'where modern collective political agency takes shape', and argues that 
these movements have displayed international characteristics from their inception (2002:1). The term 
international  civil  society is  therefore  a  category  explaining  social  and  political  agency  on  an 
international level. This understanding of the concept, he argues, will help us explain the agency of 
international civil societies , and it will also help to remedy what he calls the flaw in The English 
School, namely the inability of the concept of international society to properly account for non-state 
actors (2002:17/24). 
It  is  not  only  the  case,  according  to  Colás,  that  international  civil  societies  influence 
governments in international relations,  they also play an integral part  in shaping this  society.  As 
actors  in  this  society,  they both  help  in  reinforcing  state  institutions  and  boundaries  as  well  as 
undermining them (2002:170). Phenomena such as strike action, mass demonstrations, party-political 
activism and international solidarity campaigns, have effected change in governments. It is equally 
neglectful  to  understand  them in  a  vacuum as  it  is  to  disregard  them in  international  relations 
(2002:61/170).  NGOs  which  are  ultimately  answerable  to  international  citizenry  and  who  are 
officially independent, such as Amnesty International, are often seen as a step toward an international 
society with completely global and non-excluding actors, but Colás points to the fact that they are 
mostly, at present, only pressure groups which do not contest 'overall legitimacy of a specific regime', 
but 'merely seek to alter a particular policy' (2002:62).14 The term international civil society does not, 
in  other  words,  imply a  community of  non-state  actors  working for  the  dissolution  of  the  state 
system; as a phenomenon they might present a threat to state sovereignty indirectly, in as much as 
they operate across boundaries, but this is neither constant nor unidirectional, and according to Colás 
13   Jackson and Sørensen (2007:153-)
14 On a sidenote,  he says that NGOs which are openly political  with the intention of socio-political  change,  often have a 
problem of accountability; if international civil society is to be a space for progressive change, it is important that they have democratic  
legitimacy and are open about their political accountability (2002:63). 
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it can go both ways (2002:172). It is often their ultimate goal to appeal to the sovereign states in 
question, thereby in a sense legitimizing them. The paradoxical tension here is that social movements 
within the international civil society are often directed at national change, so they are in a sense 
caught between the national and the international, conceptually (2002:173). 
Colás  claims  that  most  of  the  civil  movements  in  the  last  century  were  essentially 
international (2002:59). This becomes evident, in his view, when one defines civil society as the space 
occupied by modern social movements. His argument seems to be that this space is present already in 
capitalist social systems (mainly because of class struggles, which in turn incite civil movements) 
and democracies. The importance of this interpretation, according to him, is not simply historical, but 
goes toward refuting the notion that the political influence of international civil society is at present 
more potential that actual; he claims to show that it has always been an actuality. Understanding 
international relations from a purely state centric view, then, would deny us understanding not only 
of international civil societies, but also of the role of states. 
2.2 – Central concepts
2.2.1 - Arena, UN
In his book on The Political Influence of Global NGOs (1998), a multiple case study which assesses 
the extent of political influence of global NGOs on treaties signed in two different conventions about 
climate and biodiversity, Bas Arts distinguishes between national and international NGOs and the 
arena in which they operate, in the following manner: “First of all, the international community lacks 
a central authority which has top-down legislative and authoritative powers […]. After all, the nation 
states  of  the  world  are  sovereign,  which  formally  implies  territorial  integrity  for  all  states,  no 
interference in internal affairs by others, and legal equality for all […]. Therefore global policies are 
based on bottom-up co-operative arrangements – agreements, declarations, treaties – between states, 
in a more or less anarchic setting […]” (1998:21). 
This  has  some  disheartening  consequences,  according  to  Bas  Arts,  the  first  being  that 
common initiatives are often 'broad, vague and weak compromises' (1998:21), and the second being 
that  the  discussions  are  aimed  at  unanimity  in  the  decision-making,  which  in  turn  becomes 
characterized  by  the  lowest  common  denominator;  when  several  parties  have  a  right  to  veto  a 
proposal, the result is that those who want less, have the biggest impact on policy (1998:21). Lastly, 
the  obvious  point  that  national  implementation  of  international  policies  is  hard  given  state 
sovereignty; in the international sphere, there are usually  few sanctions with which to punish those 
who break policy. On the other hand, giving some hope to the idea of political influence from the 
international,  is  the  fact  that  'the  meaning  and  effects  of  national  sovereignty  and  international 
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anarchy are relaxed by a great number of interdependencies among states, by international law and 
regimes as well as by international organizations', some of which have limited legislative powers 
(such as the European Commission)(1998:22). Trade measures will also serve as sanctions in some 
situations.
Bas Arts also points to the increased relevance in international relations of NGOs as a threat 
to  state-centric  theory,  but  unlike  Colás  puts  emphasis  on  the  formal  recognition  of  some 
International NGOs (INGOs) in the UN; after article 71 of the UN Charter, it has been common for 
NGOs and INGOs to participate in in UN conferences and meetings, and though they formally have 
observer  status,  they are  permitted  to make oral  statements,  present  written  position  papers  and 
occasionally  attend  working  groups  in  which  there  are  negotiations  between  nations  (1998:25). 
NGOs lobbying in the hallways and surrounding area are also common.
Bas Arts is more or less adopting the arguments toward the concept of an international society 
as opposed to an international anarchy;  in this line of thought,  as mentioned earlier,  the realism 
argument about states only meeting societal demands when it is in their interest is met by facts which 
suggest otherwise: Treaties are made and upheld even though it is not always in the interest of the 
state, and states are often hesitant to enter into a treaty, knowing that it might prove against their 
interest in the long run. This suggests that they respect the rules which, on the view of the English 
School, constitute a society. It is only natural, then, that ES would have a considerable focus on the 
role of  the UN in international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007:138). As an institution, the UN 
encompasses all the perspectives and debates within ES; realism is affirmed in the veto-system that is 
in  place  in  the  Security  Council,  in  as  much  as  it  reflects  a  power-balance  and  the  inevitable 
supremacy of  big,  military states.15  In  the  General  Assembly,  on  the  other  hand,  all  states  are 
considered equal subjects under international law, which in turn constitutes the point of view of 
rationalism. Lastly, the recognition of individuals in the declaration of human rights would represent 
the cosmopolitan perspective of solidarism (2007:48-49).16 
The concrete use of the term arena is, according to Bas Arts, appropriate in as much as there 
is 1) meetings between the relevant political players with regard to a specific policy issue 'usually in 
distinctive rounds' inside a given political organization such as the UN; 2) the politicians play a game 
with the aim of a specific outcome, 3); they all try to win, in the sense of 'furthering [their] interest 
and, hence, achieve [their] policy goals as best [they] can', through for example veto's in the case of 
decision-makers, or lobbying in the case of NGOs  and 4); 'formal and informal rules of the game 
operate: who is in or out, how one can get in, which formal competencies players have, what the 
15 Though an object of much criticism, it would make no sense from a realist perspective to ignore the fact that some states  
really do have more power than others.
16 The debate between pluralism and solidarism is likewise explicitly present in all humanitarian interventions of a military  
nature that are undertaken or sanctioned by the UN. Furthermore, the argument can be made as to the declining influence of the UN on  
the dominant states, such as the US, and the frequency of unilateral decisions; this possibly suggest a return to state centrism and,  
perhaps, realism replacing rationalism as the dominant point in the triangle of ES. 
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domain of the game is, how conflicts are settled and decisions are made, how players should behave, 
which strategies to influence the outcome are legitimate (or not), what the relationship with players 
outside the arena is,  etc.'  (1998:55).  Determining an actor's  access  to the arena in  question is  a 
necessary step in analysing their political influence; in a sense, it constitutes a limit on their options 
and strategies. This study will use Bas Arts' definition of political arena, meaning 'the formal meeting 
place of political players who struggle, debate, negotiate and decide on policy issues and, in doing  
so, are bound by given rules (although they may be changed by the players as well) '  (Bas Arts, 
1998:55). 
The limits of the metaphor is that it paints a picture of the rules as too static, but it is useful 
and precise when determining a single relation of political influence,  for example in going from 
NGOs to the UN; it would be going to far, in Bas Arts' opinion, 'to see the NGO-state relationship at  
global level as one characterized by interdependence'  (1998:56). As it is, states are the dominant 
formal  policy-  and  decision-makers,  rendering  the  opposing  concept  of  “policy  networks”  less 
relevant  in  comparison  to  the  concept  of  an  arena.  The  ability  of  actors  which  are  not  always 
formally recognized as such, namely NGOs or networks of NGOs, to influence policy issues, is what 
is relevant here. The question is whether these actors are playing by the same rules as the formally 
recognized actors, i.e. states, and if not, how do they fit into this arena? What is their ability to 
manoeuvre in this setting, and how do they make use of it? 
2.2.2 - NGOs and political influence
Bas Arts explains that the general definition of an NGO, as 'any organization which is not established 
by a government or group of governments' (1998:24), is too inclusive in that it would include sports 
clubs and terrorist groups. In stead, he opts for the definition of NGOs as non-profit pressure groups,  
as this suggests relevance to the political arena. The UN's definition of INGOs is any organization 
not established by intergovernmental agreements, which would include the Mafia. It is necessary to 
define INGOs as pressure groups trying to influence political decisions in international relations in 
order to meaningfully narrow it down and to capture the nature and goal of an NGO (1998:49). To 
further classify it, Amnesty International – for example – is not a sectional group, i.e. economic or 
recreational, but a promotional group that is issue-specific (human rights), as opposed to religious or 
political.  According  to  his  definitions  and  classifications,  then,  a  global  NGO such as  Amnesty 
International would be defined as a  'promotional pressure group which seeks  to influence political  
decision-making on certain issues at global level' (1998:50).17
17 This definition is adequate for single actors, such as Amnesty International, but not for transnational advocacy networks, which 
will be covered below and which is a more fitting description of the actors in the present study, namely several NGOs working 
together on the Control Arms Campaign and in the ATT Steering Committee. 
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 There is a distinction between the notions NGO, INGO and global NGO, in so far as the first 
is national, the second is rooted in two or more countries, where as the latter is inherently global in 
it's focus. It is common for NGOs to be involved with international issues to some extent or other; 
thus, the term global NGOs is introduced to apply to NGOs which are inherently directed toward 
international issues and policy making on a global scale. This does not mean that the global NGO 
cannot be rooted in only one or more countries; the essential criteria is that the NGO is active at the 
global level (1998:51). This is a case study focusing primarily on Amnesty International, IANSA and 
Oxfam,  which are global NGOs in the international sphere with international member representation, 
and with an inherently global agenda, so in using the term NGO when referring to AI, Oxfam or 
IANSA, it will hereafter refer to a global NGO (in the following chapters, this paper omits the prefix 
global for reasons of brevity).18 
“Political influence has been defined as the achievement of (a part of) one's policy goal with 
regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation, which is (at least partly) caused by 
one's own and intentional intervention in the political arena and process concerned. This implies that 
one's policy goal would not have been achieved – or would have been achieved to a lesser extent – if  
one had not intervened. Therefore the so-called counterfactual would have been different.” (Bas Arts, 
1998:301).   
Bas Arts separates the concept of policy from politics in the sense that 'the term politics refers  
to both process and product, whereas the term policy refers only to the product itself' (1998:19). The 
concept  of  political  influence is  highly  problematical,  both  theoretically  and  methodologically. 
Conceptually separating power from influence is the first challenge, and delineating the resulting 
definition of influence, the second. On first glance, power would mean the same as influence, namely 
the ability of actor A to influence decision-maker B. However, in terms of a specific policy decision, 
it is entirely possible for an NGO actor to influence a policy equally or more efficiently than, for  
example, the USA – without there being any doubt that the latter is the more powerful actor. Bas Arts 
therefore introduced a notion of permanence separating power from influence, where after political 
power refers to the more or less permanent ability to influence policy making, and political influence 
is only episodic (1998:58). As for the second problem, it has to do with whether the influence is 
measured  in  an  NGOs  opportunity  to  present  their  case,  in  the  actual  adopting  of  their 
recommendations or demands in  the policy,  in  the formation of the treaty itself  or if  it  is  to be 
measured in the carrying out of the treaty by the nations in question.
In legitimizing the measurement with the use of a counterfactual qualification, Bas Arts is in a 
18 Bas Arts  also distinguishes between pressure groups and protest  action.  The former operate  inside the limits  of formal  
politics; they make use of their formal position, such as oral statements in the UN, to advocate their cause, as well as general lobbying  
directly to decision-makers (1998:51). Protest groups, on the other hand, operate outside the formal arena – meaning in the press,  
through  campaigns,  protest  marches  and  similar  action.  Amnesty  International,  for  example,  is  mostly  a  pressure  group,  but  
occationally a protest action group; this study will focus primarily on their capacity in the former arena.
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sense begging the question; the point of it is to make the analysis of political influence falsifiable, but 
as the counterfactual can't be measured in and of itself, he is back where he started. Who knows how 
it would have been had the NGO not been a part of the process? This presupposes that the NGO is  
the only one lobbying for a certain set of goals. In the cases where there is overdetermination, i.e. 
several actors of disparate power voicing roughly the same agenda, all that can be offered in terms of 
proof are probabilistic assessments based on a significant overlap between policy outcomes and the 
written intentions of the NGO in question. Since this thesis is not concerned with the extent of their 
influence, reasoning based on counterfactual assessments will be of limited relevance. As it relates to 
the concept of political influence, it is still an implication that the last sentence of the above quote 
should read that 'the so-called counterfactual' would probably have been different. 
2.2.3 - Treaties, regimes
As a regime, the Arms Trade treaty is  intended to be an example of 'hard law', meaning that in 
addition to representing a set of obligations, there should also be sanctions toward non-conforming 
behaviour; i.e. an example of treaties which are signed in the context of international organizations, 
and which are legally binding to its members. An important distinction is between legally-binding 
conventions  and treaties,  and non-binding legal  documents  such as  'resolutions,  declarations and 
recommendations', where the former is generally referred to as 'hard law' and the latter as 'soft law' 
(Bas  Arts,  1998:62).  According  to  Young,  in  his  book  Creating  Regimes:  Arctic  Accords  and  
International Governance, 1998, the goal of the process of regime formation, whether it has to do 
with soft or hard law, is to reach 'agreement on packages of mutually acceptable provisions suitable  
for  expression  in  documents  that  are  treated  as  constitutive  contracts'  (Young,  1998:4).  These 
provisions are essentially translated into social practices.
According to Young, regimes are almost always made through negotiation between two or 
more actors upon the terms of a constitutive contract; this negotiation, however, is often decided by 
side-agreements (secret or not), informal deals, tacit understandings and other informal elements. 
These  are  often  not  only  part  of  the  negotiation,  but  sometimes  crucial  to  it's  successful  
implementation (1998:11). Furthermore, the procedural elements of the negotiations are made all the 
more important by the exploratory element of the negotiations, in so far as it is often unknown to 
actors what they can expect to get out of the bargaining; – it often involves, according to Young, 
creative components (1998:12). Consequently, the negotiations involved in creating a regime are best 
described as dynamic, open-ended and multidimensional. Because of this flexibility, in adopting Bas 
Arts'  use of  the  term arena for  an explanation of  the  UN as  a  setting,  it  is  with the  qualifying 
assumption that the rules of the game and the negotiations are open to manipulation by both state and 
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non-state actors with regard to the final outcome, i.e. the Arms Trade Treaty. 
Young  differentiates  the  different  phases  of  a  regime  formation:  agenda  formation,  
negotiation  and  operationalization (1998:2).19 Most  research,  writes  Young,  is  centered  on  the 
negotiation phase, thereby perhaps neglecting the agenda forming and the operationalization stages. 
Put simply, Young defines the agenda forming phase as covering the processes through which 'an 
issue  initially  finds  its  way  onto  the  international  political  agenda  and  rises  to  a  sufficiently 
prominent  place on this  agenda to  justify the investment  of  time and political  capital  needed to 
embark  on  explicit  negotiations'  (1998:5).  Important  questions  in  this  respect  would  be  who 
participated the most in framing the issue, though Young states that it is often not entirely in the 
control of actors; it is often affected by outside events, compromises and dissent (1998:10).20 
Methods used in the context of negotiation, he says, are bargaining with threats, committal 
tactics and promises, as well as deal-making skills and entrepreneurial techniques (1998:15). The aim 
is  generally  not,  as  in  legislative  settings,  to  put  together  winning  coalitions,  but  rather  'the 
negotiation stage of regime formation aims at building consensus among as many participants as 
possible'  (1998:13).  Young  puts  emphasis  on  the  complexity  of  actor  intentions  in  this  regard: 
"Governments simply do not act as rational utility maximizers, even when there is little internal 
opposition  to  the  initiatives  they  take.  Rather,  they  tend  to  adopt  causes,  like  the  Norwegian 
government's espousal of a regime for the Barents Region, and then to advocate these causes in a 
determined manner in their dealings with others' (1998:14). Adding to this, Young writes that there 
are often different factions in a state working for opposite goals, leading to a two-level game. Also, 
pressure  groups  can  cause  governments  to  act  in  a  'contradictory or  inconsistent  manner  in  the 
negotiation process leading to regime formation at the international level' (1998:14). This can in turn 
lead  to  non-state  actors  becoming  actors  in  the  negotiation  process,  leading  to  provisions  that 
governments would not introduce. The interplay between non-state actor's expectation of a regime 
and that of nation's interests is a central part of the problematic involved in the ATT, as discussed in 
chapter four.  
2.2.4 - Actor characteristics, advocacy networks
Margaret  E.  Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,  working in  collaboration on the  book  Activists  Beyond 
19 Regimes can fail at any points in the process, he says, and the reasons for failure can be manifold, ranging from lack of  
attention,  priority  and  closure,  and  '[e]ven  signed  agreements  sometimes  become  dead  letters'  (1998:2).  Consequently,  different  
propositions have to be made for the different stages in order for regime formation theory to be sound; it is not  empirically viable to  
assume a uniform process, or a universal set of  prerequisite conditions, throughout the process (1998:4).
20 The last stage in Young's theory of regime formation,  operationalization, is less relevant to this study as the ATT has yet to  
arrive  at  this  stage  (post  2012).  The  operationalization  phase  adds  to  the  already  negotiated  documents  a  set  of  'procedural  
arrangements or programmatic activities at the international level' (17). It varies from regime to regime whether it is put in force  
immediately, or whether there is to be a transitional period. Also, it varies whether the regimes are such that they require legislative  
politics or agency politics (i.e. soft law or hard law) in their operationalization. Regime formation is at an end, writes Young, once  
internal operationalization is in practice (19). 
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Borders  (1998)  and  articles  based  on  this  work,  such  as  Transnational  advocacy  networks  in  
international  and  regional  politics  (1999),  both  of  which  will  be  discussed  here,  argue  for  the 
relevancy of advocacy networks as opening new channels of influence besides the market influence 
and the influence of states. In the present context, their work will be used to further define the role of 
transnational advocacy networks in international relations; specifically, to define the role of NGOs 
with regard to their goals, methods and strategies, both internally and externally. Keck and Sikkink 
also discuss the conditions under which such networks can be most effective. Later on, their findings 
regarding the exact nature of network influence will be discussed in relation to the findings of this 
case study. Since the actors in the present study are three NGOs working together in a campaign 
(Control Arms), on the one hand, and playing the leading roles in an even bigger network of NGOs 
(the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee) on the other, this is a necessary addition to the more 
isolated definitions from Bas Arts in terms of actor characteristics. 
Keck  and  Sikkink  define  transnational  advocacy  networks  as  'networks  of  activists, 
distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation', 
as  opposed  to  economic  actors  and  firms  and  alongside,  but  not  opposed  to,  purely  epistemic 
communities such as scientists and experts (1998:1). Their primary significance is that by building 
'new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, they multiply the 
channels  of  access  to  the  international  system'  (1998:1).  Additionally,  they  make  'international 
resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles' in a way that transforms 
the practice of national sovereignty (1998:2). They argue that the reason this phenomenon is to a 
large extent overlooked in theory, is that  values are a motive which falls outside the accustomed 
categories. “A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an  
issue,  who are  bound together  by  shared values,  a  common discourse,  and dense  exchanges  of  
information and services” (1999:89). 
Central  to  their  argument  is  the  notion  that  the  high  value-content  of  their  issues  are  a 
prerequisite of their influence, along with their ability to frame the question or issue by bringing new 
ideas,  norms  and  discourses  into  policy  debates,  and  by serving  as  sources  of  information  and 
testimony (1998:3). The goal is to 'change the behaviour of states and of international organizations' 
which are, more often than not, more powerful than them (1999:90). In order to do this, they must 
seek to maximize their influence or leverage over their targets (1998:3). Keck and Sikkink note that 
they operate within a “political space” internally as well, as different actors come together in the 
network with different social, cultural and political backgrounds. This entails a certain amount of 
negotiation with regard to coming up with a joint enterprise, something that is especially relevant to 
the example used in this case study in as much as it applies both formally and informally to the 
relationship  between  the  NGOs  in  question  (1999:90).  The  notion  of  transnational  advocacy 
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networks does not always equate to national or international NGOs, of course, as it is a broader term, 
but they often play a prominent or exclusive role in these networks. In the case of the Control Arms 
campaign,  the  three  most  prominent  NGOs would be AI,  Oxfam and IANSA – what  Keck and 
Sikkink refer to as the core actors – but the network would include all their contacts and all the 
NGOs involved in the ATT SC, as well as a number of other NGOs who have contributed in one way 
or another. Networks are, according to Keck and Sikkink, 'forms of organization characterized by 
voluntary,  reciprocal  and  horizontal  patterns  of  communication  and  exchange',  presumably  to 
emphasize the non-hierarchical nature you would find in firms and governments (1999:91).  The 
notion of advocacy is added because the actors plead a cause, or the causes of others, so that they are 
not easily analyzed by a standard concept of “interest” (1999:91). 
Keck  and  Sikkink  define  a  campaign  as  'sets  of  strategically  linked  activities  in  which 
members of a diffuse principled network […] develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized 
roles in pursuit of a common goal' (1998:6). The process of integrating the various elements into a 
whole with a “common frame of meaning” is usually undertaken by the core actors, and will often be 
a challenging task because of cultural and structural diversity within the network (1998:7). They put 
a lot of weight on the notion of “negotiation of meaning” and its relation to the evolution of tactics  
within a  campaign,  stating that  this  allows them to 'recognize that  cultural  differences,  different 
conceptions of the stakes in a campaign, and resource inequalities among network actors exist' and 
that, at the same time, they can identify critical roles that actors fill (1998:8). In framing the issue, 
campaigns are limited by the rules of the area in which they are to be carried out. For example, the 
Control Arms campaign must frame the issue in a manner that works for both the different factions in 
the campaign itself, as well as for the target audience, which in this case will be government officials 
at the UN and in capitals. Keck and Sikkink refer to the dual goals of this framing as “strategic 
portrayal” (1998:8). 
Groups  in  these  networks,  they  write,  are  constantly  exchanging  information  (1998:10). 
Additionally, they try to organize the gathering and flow of information in a way that best suits the 
campaign,  or  in  a way that  will  constitute  a  base for  their  campaigns.  Their  ability to 'generate 
information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively, is their most valuable currency' and is 
also 'central to their identity' (1998:10). For the core actors this entails recruiting allies with access to  
relevant information, writes Keck and Sikkink, adding that since different ways of issue-framing 
sometimes requires different kinds of information, this will often result in disputes over framing and 
can therefore be a source of change within the network (1999:92). They use two terms to deal with 
such frames, the first one being frame alignment, meaning the rendering of events or occurrences as 
meaningful,  which  in  turn  organizes  experience  and  guides  action  (1999:95).  Frame  resonance 
'concerns the relationship between an organization's interpretive work and its  ability to influence 
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broader  public  understandings',  the  latter  encompassing  the  duality  of  strategic  portrayal,  as 
mentioned above (1999:95).21 This is not merely relevant at the outset; old problems will often be 
framed in new ways, to reach other venues or overcome new challenges. 
Writing  about  under  what  conditions  these  networks  have  the  most  influence,  they  put 
emphasis on issue- and actor characteristics as important parts of the explanation (1999:99). The first 
term refers to the impact a certain issue is likely to have with its audience, and the second one refers 
to the strength, density and leverage of the network (1998:26). With regard to issue characteristics, 
their conclusion is that issues with clear causal chains leading from a responsible party to a victim 
have  bigger  success  than  'irredeemably  structural'  problems.  The  appeal  lies  in  what  they  call 
“normative  logic”  (1998:27).  Also,  issues  which  involve  legal  equality  of  opportunity have  had 
success,  such as slavery and woman suffrage, as this appeals to a juridical and institutional logic 
(1998:28).  With regard to actor characteristics, networks must be dense in the meaning of having 
many, strongly connected actors with reliable information; they must have member representation 
and institutional leverage in the targeted countries (1998:28-29). Actor characteristics apply to their 
targets as well, who must be 'vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions from outside 
actors,  or  they must  be  sensitive  to  pressure  because  of  gaps  between stated  commitments  and 
practice' (1998:29). In this sense, leverage has two sides – on the one hand is the access to leverage, 
on the other is the vulnerability. 
2.3 – Operational concepts
2.3.1 - Forms of influence
Regarding how transnational  advocacy networks  work,  Keck and Sikkink develops  a  four  point 
typology, consisting of  information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics  and  accountability  
politics (1999:95).  Since they lack power in the traditional sense (I..e military, financially, formally 
or  institutionally),  they  must  use  these  forms  of  persuasion  to  achieve  their  goals.  Information 
politics covers the 'ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will 
have the most impact' (1999:95). This information covers not only facts, but also testimonies, and 
usually frames the question in simple terms of right and wrong; it must also be framed in such a way 
that it identifies responsible parties and proposes credible solutions (1999:96). Keck and Sikkink add 
that testimonies, once their story has gone through layers of interpretation and is finally published, by 
media or NGOs directly, are often altered significantly. They point to the way in which NGOs have 
helped to legitimize the use of testimonies, and that they are often used in conjuncture with statistics 
in order to give the presentation a human interest angle (1999:96). As they often rely upon the media 
21 A more specific characterization of strategies will be discussed in 2.3, below. 
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to disclose their findings, it is paramount for them to 'cultivate a reputation for credibility with the 
press' and present them with appropriately framed material (1999:96). The emphasis of NGOs on 
information  politics  is  echoed  in  Manno  (1994),  who  explains  how (environmental)  NGOs  can 
translate the technical language of the issue into the language of politics (1994:107). 
Symbolic politics are defined as the 'ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make 
sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away' (1999:95). Simply put, they 
must use symbolic events, often the juxtaposition of two events, to launch a new interpretation of 
values; an example used by Keck and Sikkink is the juxtaposition of 'the coup in Chile, the war in 
Vietnam, Watergate, and civil rights', which in turn, because of transnational activism, gave birth to 
the human rights movement (1999:97). Leverage politics covers the 'ability to call upon powerful 
actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence', where 
powerful  actors  usually  mean  governments  or  international  financial  institutions  (1999:95). 
Identifying points of leverage, they write, is often the most important strategic step in a campaign 
(1999:97). They divide the concept in two, the first being material leverage, which usually involves 
“issue-linkage” such as convincing some nations to cut off the economic aid to another because they 
are violating human rights,  thereby essentially linking human rights  to  money (1998:23).  Moral 
leverage,  they write,  'involves what some commentators have called the 'mobilization of shame', 
where the behavior of target actors is held up to the bright light of international scrutiny' (1999:97). 
This is of course most effective with states that are concerned about their prestige. Accountability 
politics  are  defined  as  'the  effort  to  oblige  more  powerful  actors  to  act  on  vaguer  policies  or 
principles they formally endorsed', a dynamic which is in response to governments saying one thing, 
but  doing  another  in  practice;  having  this  gap  exposed  can  be  embarrassing  to  governments 
(1999:95/1998:24).
According to Young, the categories of tactics that are used in regime formation come in three 
different sets,  corresponding to the previously mentioned stages: The tactics used with regard to 
agenda formation is simply to influence the framing of the problem. During negotiations, threats and 
promises are the most pronounced tactics. In the last stage, tactics of 'administrative or bureaucratic 
politics' are the most important (1998:21). Young writes that 'agenda formation is a time for focusing 
on the big picture' (1998:21), while negotiations are focused upon the phrasing of written agreements 
and operationalization upon domestic concerns, which in turn might not coincide with international 
considerations. Keck  and  Sikkink  operate  with  similar  stages,  but  from the  point  of  view  of  a 
network's  political  influence  (slightly  paraphrased  here):  1)  issue  creation/agenda  setting,  2) 
influence on the discursive position of states, 3) on institutional procedures, 4) on policy change in 
target actors, 5) on state behavior (1999:98). The first stage requires networks to generate attention 
for new issues, which in turn often involves 'a modification of the 'value context' in which a policy 
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debate take[s] place' (1999:98). The second stage is about getting states to change their policies, to 
support international declarations or to make more binding commitments (1999:98). Stage three is 
where NGOs attempt to facilitate change in several states, institutions or even, as is the case here, 
regime change; Keck and Sikkink quickly point out how policy change should not be confused with 
actual  change  in  behavior,  which  does  not  always  follow  (1999:98).  Meaningful  policy  and 
behavioural change, they write, is more 'likely when the first three types or stages of impact have  
occurred' (1999:98).
Table 2.1
 Agenda formation Negotiation Operationalization
1: Issue creation 2: Influence on state's position 5: State behaviour. 
2: Influence on state's positions 3: Institutional procedures
3: Institutional procedures 4: Policy change
 
It is important to note that Young's account of the stages of regime formation do not directly overlap 
with Keck and Sikkinks account of network influence, as shown in the above figure.22 The reason for 
this  is  related to the difference in focus between the role  of states and the role of transnational  
advocacy networks vis-a-vis a specific regime/treaty.  By way of example,  network's will seek to 
change state's policies, as well as institutional procedures, both during what Young would describe as 
the agenda formation phase and the negotiation phase. 
2.3.2 -  Operational concepts
In  the  preceding  chapter,  the  theoretical  debates  underlying  the  role  of  non-state  actors  in 
international relations have been outlined, starting with the debate on state-centrism and international 
civil society, moving on to international civil society. Colás argues that the inability to account for 
non-state actors is a serious flaw in traditional transnational theory, neorealism and in the English 
School. The social movements of the previous century, he argues, were essentially international and 
as  such  are  cases  where  non-state  actors  were  significantly influential  both  in  the  national  and 
international sphere (2.1). Next, the concept of an arena was defined and discussed in relation to the 
UN, adopting some elements from Bas Arts while  mitigating them with the notion from regime 
theory of negotiations as more dynamic and open-ended than this picture would suggest (2.2.1). In 
2.2.2, NGOs and the concept of political influence were defined and delineated from the concept of 
political power. 2.2.3 explained some aspects of treaties using regime theory, and 2.2.4 discussed 
actor characteristics under the concept of transnational advocacy networks, further explaining the 
agency of non-state actors such as AI, IANSA and Oxfam working together.   
22 This figure is just an overview, not in any way an explanatory model. 
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The operational concepts used in the analysis (chapter 4), will primarily be the four point 
typology of Keck and Sikkink as discussed in 2.3, meaning information politics, symbolic politics,  
accountability politics  and  leverage politics, along with the definition of stages employed in both 
their  theory  and  some  aspects  of  Young's  account  of  regime  formation  and  negotiation.  The 
definitions  of  arena,  political  influence,  treaties  and  transnational  advocacy networks,  and  their 
related hypotheses, will be discussed in relation to the data and revised where this is needed. In 4.2, 
the typology will be used to analyze the strategy and methods of the NGOs in question, as well as 
indicate where this typology fails in accurately representing the gathered data. This approach will 
hopefully lead to a clearer understanding of how transnational advocacy networks influence world 
politics, what their options are in achieving a policy goal at the UN, what kind of problems they 
encounter and what measures they apply to overcome them. Chapter 5 will sum up the findings and 
discuss what implications they have for theory.
20
Chapter 3 – Method
In the following chapter I will explain my methodological choices; discuss some problems related to 
field-work,  bias  and sources;  explain  how the  method relates  to  the  problem statement  and the 
structure of the analysis; and, lastly, discuss the reliability and validity of the employed method. In 
3.1, the choice of method and sources will be presented, and in 3.2 the reliability and validity will be 
discussed. 
3.1.1 - Qualitative, iterative approach, single-case case-study
This study is to be regarded as interpretative social research, as it is a single-case case-study based on 
qualitative methods.  Corbin and Strauss (1998) define qualitative research as 'any type of research 
that  produces  findings  not  arrived  at  by  statistical  procedures  or  other  means  of  quantification' 
(1998:10-11). This can entail research about people's lives, experience, behaviors and emotions, as 
well as about 'organizational functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena, and interactions 
between  nations'  (1998:11).  While  some  elements  of  quantification  can  be  found,  the  authors 
maintain that the bulk of the analysis is interpretative. Methods associated with qualitative research, 
such as interviews and observation, are not exclusive; data gathered by these methods will often be 
quantified  later  in  statistical  analysis.  Thus,  they are  referring  to  a  'nonmathematical  process  of 
interpretation, carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and 
then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme', where data might consist of interviews, 
documents, films and even, in some cases, quantified data (1998:11). 
In experimental research, according to Bryman (2004), it is ideally the case that the research 
hypotheses  are  deduced from theory and then  tested.23 The  initial  deduction  of  hypothesis  from 
theory,  followed  by  the  induction  of  conclusions  back  into  theory,  is  part  of  the  positivistic 
foundation of quantitative research. According to Holliday (2007), one of the main differences is to 
be  found  in  the  open-ended  process  of  qualitative  research.  Where  Bryman  makes  a  point  of 
quantitative  research  as  devising  hypotheses  from theory  and  then  subjecting  them to  test  (e.g. 
experiments), qualitative research will start off with deciding what subject is interesting, explore the 
subject  in the field and then let  'focus and themes emerge',  devising research instruments in  the 
course of the process (2007:6). This is especially apparent in the case of the qualitative method of 
grounded theory as developed by Strauss and Glaser, where theory is derived from data (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1998:12). The grounding of concepts in data and the creativity of researchers are the main 
23 Bryman offers the following main steps as an  idealized picture of how quantitative research is done, in sequence: theory, 
hypothesis, research design, devising measures of concepts, selecting research sites, selecting research subjects, administering research  
instruments, processing data, analyzing data, findings/conclusions and the writing of finding/conclusions (Bryman 2004:63).
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characteristics of this method, and – aside from when the object is to expand existing research – the 
research  will  start  on what  would be  the  middle  of  Brymans  idealized  sequence  of  quantitative 
research  (see  above)  and  move  backwards  toward  theory  (Bryman  2004:63;  Corbin  & 
Strauss,1998:13).  The advantage,  according to  Corbin  & Strauss,  of  building  rather  than  testing 
theory, is that the resulting theory is more likely to resemble reality than a method which devices it's 
hypothesis beforehand on intuition or speculation (1998:13-15).
The precise nature of the dynamics of the political influence that is in question in this study 
can't be determined quantitatively, as the variables are assumed to be grounded in 'meaningful social 
and cultural settings' (Hønneland, 2000:7). The intention of actors and the policy goals in question 
are all grounded in normative frameworks, and the problems they encounter are presumably only to 
be understood within a social setting using interpretative methods. If the questions asked were related 
more to the extent of their political influence and the frequency in which certain methods were used, 
a quantitative approach might have been better  suited,  either in lieu of a qualitative one or as a 
supplement,  but  in  order  to  devise  correct  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  this  influence,  their 
methods  and  –  more  importantly  –  how  this  could  be  turned  into  measurable  concepts  for  a 
quantitative approach, a qualitative investigation would still have to come in advance. The goal here 
is to understand the political influence that occurs in this scenario – an activity that should precede 
it's measurement.  
As was shown in the theory chapter,  this  project borrows some aspects of Bas Arts'  The 
Political Influence of Global NGOs (1998), which is a hybrid, a form of study described by Bryman 
where in  'qualitative research is conducted within a quasi-experimental (i.e quantitative) research 
design' (2004:61). Writing about the outset of his research project, Bas Arts points out that there was 
little theory to be found on which he could find concepts, hypotheses and clues to the design of the 
study (1998:30). This assessment still holds some relevance; although there have been significant 
advances in NGO theory the last decade, it is far from exhaustive and certainly not canonized. Bas 
Arts wanted to assess the political influence in a large number of cases in the manner of a semi-
quantitative  evaluation,  but  was  forced  to  do  exploratory  research  –  interviews  and  participant 
observation – in order to formulate a valid proposal. He had to continuously adjust the conceptual 
and technical design throughout the research, in what he describes as an iterative approach. This 
approach, he says, 'is inspired by the iterative thinking in mathematics, by which the outcome of one 
phase of analysis becomes the input of a next phase until there is (some) congruence in outcomes 
over several phases' (1998:31). The creative interplay between design, implementation and report of 
the study are constantly revised against each other until consistency (presumably meaning validity 
and reliability) is achieved. 
Bryman compares this kind of procedure to Strauss' grounded theory approach, as discussed 
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above (2004:67).  The end result  for  Bas  Arts  was  a  qualitative  multiple-case study with  strong 
undertones  of  quantitative  evaluation,  though  without  numerical  precision.  He  maintained  his 
evaluative  objective,  but  restricted  his  sampling  to  a  few cases  and  used  sources  of  data  more 
commonly associated with qualitative research (Bas Arts, 1998:32-33). In short, his research drifted 
into a qualitative one based on what he deemed most suitable in the course of the project, and while 
his pretensions to generalization and precision were mitigated, he nevertheless retained his goal of 
assessing the "to what extent" question (1998:37).24  My own experience mirrored that of Bas Arts in 
many respects, having to continuously reframe my project whenever my initial assumptions about the 
subject matter were mistaken. The initial hypotheses drawn from theory and written down before the 
field-work was undertaken, were not wrong in the sense that they were disproven by the facts – they 
were irrelevant to what was actually taking place, in some places completely missing the issue. This 
has led to several changes in the type of theory used, the framing of the initial problem statement and 
in the use of sources. 
This  study has  adopted  the  concept  of  an  iterative  qualitative  approach,  though with  the 
omission of  the  quantitative pretensions  of  Bas  Arts  and the post-modern elements  of  grounded 
theory. Regarding the former, this study aims for an understanding of political influence and how it is 
achieved, and will for scope and resource related reasons not venture into a comparative study of the  
extent of political influence over several cases. Regarding the latter, while a lot of the characteristics 
of grounded theory are to be found in this iterative approach, a significant  portion of the data is  
covered by contemporary theory and my goal is to expand upon existing theory more than to create  
my own. The criteria for interpreting the findings will be determined by the theory used, and the 
methodological approach will  in part  be what Yin describes as “pattern-matching” (1994:25-26); 
even though the study has only a single case, it will serve to either match or not match propositions 
from the given theory (alternately,  it  might  affirm only one of  two rival  theories).  The study is 
descriptive and aimed at understanding, not causal explanation. 
3.1.2 - Choice of case, field-work, sources, triangulation
The choice of the Control Arms Campaign and the Arms Trade Treaty as a case was not in any way 
based on random sampling, but rather on information obtained when working as an intern at the 
Northern Regional  Office of Amnesty International  Norway;  I  worked there in  the fall  of 2008, 
hoping perhaps to get some insight into the lobbying/activism business for what was then to be a 
study on the UN and humanitarian interventions. A chance encounter and discussion with a lobbyist 
24 He essentially preserved the duality of analysing the quality of the political influence in depth, and also that of assessing the  
quantity or extent of the influence (it should be noted in relation to this that the cases were quite broad in terms of the number of actors  
involved, and that the timeline was five years). 
23
from New York during the AI biannual meeting led to the choice of the Control Arms Campaign as 
material for a case-study; apparently it stood apart from any other initiative they had made in the UN 
in terms of being 1) an NGO initiative, 2) hugely successful and 3) a cooperation between several 
NGOs.  Having already worked on Amnesty International  Campaigns in  the capacity of intern,  I 
mistakenly thought it would be easy to get access to information and informants. 
The value of this case, as opposed to other campaigns in the same time-period, is that it could 
arguably constitute what Flyvbjerg (2006) calls a paradigmatic case, as delineated in contrast to an 
extreme, revelatory or critical one.  The different types of case studies are defined and categorized 
differently by various authors, but this study uses the definitions of Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2006). 
According to Flyvbjerg,  a paradigmatic case is  one that has metaphorical and prototypical value 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006:232). This is hard to determine beforehand, however, as the prototypical case will 
be the case that defines the criteria for what is prototypical.25 In this  circularity,  some degree of 
intuition-based choice is unavoidable.  The case analysis itself and its relation to other cases will be 
the final justification of this assessment – it cannot be made in advance.  The motivation for this 
choice of case and methods are to get a firm analytical grip on the exact dynamics of the political 
influence in question, as well as the problem areas and applied solutions that the actors encounter and 
make use of. Due to it's apparent successful nature, this campaign should be paradigmatic in terms of 
political influence.  The control arms case can be said to be an extreme case, if one makes the – for 
that matter, plausible – assumption that activism is not generally this successful on the decision-
making level of the United Nations. There are, however, various campaigns with similar degrees of 
success.  Yin  defines  the  revelatory case as  one  where  'the investigator  has  access  to  a  situation 
previously inaccessible to scientific observation' (1994:41), which is not likely to be the case here. 
Neither is it a critical case, meaning that I cannot logically generalize from the truth value here to 
something being true or false for all possible cases of this nature. 
The most valuable source of information were undoubtedly the informants, and, as mentioned 
before, these were also the hardest to come by. The original idea was to travel with the lobbyists to 
the July '09 Open Ended Working Group at the UN, but this fell through on account of them not 
finding  the  time.  Subsequently,  I  spent  months  trying  to  set  up  interviews  during  the 
October/November '09 First Committee meeting at the UN, but the appointments fell through yet 
again. In December 2009 I had made so many calls to the lobbyists at the International Secretariat of 
Amnesty International in London, that their campaign coordinator gave in and set up interviews for 
me with the key people working on the campaign and the ATT Steering Committee in the three major 
NGOs.  Due to  cancellations  on their  part  during  my week in  London,  I  could  only make three 
25   “ As with the critical case, we may ask, How does one identify a paradigmatic case? How does one determine whether a given case 
has metaphorical and prototypical value? These questions are even more difficult to answer than for the critical case precisely because 
the paradigmatic case transcends any sort of rule-based criteria. No standard exists for the paradigmatic case because it sets the 
standard.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:14)
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interviews in person, while the rest had to be conducted over the phone. 
Yin (1994), lists the following advantages and disadvantages of using interviews as part of the 
collecting of evidence for case studies (along with documentation, archival records, observation and 
artefacts): They are advantageous in so far as they are targeted directly on the topic and are insightful 
in the sense that they provide 'perceived causal inferences'; disadvantageous in the sense that they are 
dependant on the quality of questions, biased in response, dependant on subjects memory and lastly,  
in so far as the 'interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear' (1994:80). His suggestions are that 
one makes sure that questions are not leading; for example, if the interviewer is in fact familiar with  
the situation he is asking about, he might ask purposely naive/unassuming questions so as not to lead 
the  interviewee  into  confirmation  (1994:85).  More  generally,  his  advice  is  to  use  corroborating 
sources, both in the sense of interviewees from different "camps", and other sources of data than 
interviews (1994:85).  While  I  made a  point  of  following his  advice,  it  sometimes  proved more 
problematic; questions that were pointedly unassuming often had to be clarified, resulting in more 
leading questions, and a lot of the obtained information is of such a nature that it is either hard or 
impossible to verify with outside sources. The following table shows the selection of informants:
Table 3.1
Informant Position/NGO Type Transcript Anonymity Length
Informant #1 Military, Security & Police
Researcher, Amnesty Int.
In person Yes Yes 1-2 hours
Informant #2 Program Officer, IANSA In person Yes Pending 
Transcript
1-2 hours
Informant #3 Campaign Coordinator, 
Amnesty  Int.  /  Convener,  ATT 
Steering Committee
In person Yes Yes 1-2 hours
Informant #4 Advocacy Officer, Amnesty Int. Phone No Pending 
Permission
30 minutes
Informant #5 Campaign Manager, Oxfam Int. Phone No Yes 30 minutes
Informant #6 Campaigner, Amnesty Int. Phone No Pending 
Permission
30 minutes
I will rely mostly on the three longer interviews, as I was able to use a recording device and therefore 
won't  have  to  rely  on  memory.26 Another  reason  is  that  the  phone  interviews  were  conducted 
impromptu - in as much as I was called by them, and was therefore slightly unprepared – and  in two  
cases cut short. I have kept the anonymity of my sources, as was agreed upon in the interviews; I was 
given permission by everyone to refer to their position in the NGO, and by some to use their name 
provided they had seen a final draft before it was handed in (which is not the case at the moment).27 
26 Unfortunately, the page-limit of this thesis precludes the inclusion of transcripts. 
27 Since the informants are representatives for the organization, they are likely to want to present it in a certain fashion. Some  
questions are designed to get behind what Bas Arts call the disproportionate ego-perception of NGOs, meaning their tendency to  
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One of the strategies used during the interviews, was not to interrupt the  informants in order to 
maintain the structure of my questions, but instead to let them talk as much as possible in their own 
line of thought. This led to some unexpected information that would not have been obtained through 
direct answers to the previously determined questions. Although I remained flexible and didn't stick 
to the exact order of questions, the information obtained from informants #1-3 is largely consistent 
with the following categories of questions: 
- Set 1: Orientational questions: These dealt with anonymity, the presence of a tape recorder, 
the informants position in the NGO, their length of employment and various tasks.
-  Set 2:  Questions about preparatory work: These questions dealt with their strategies and 
methods  in  preparatory  work  before  UN  meetings,  including  campaigning,  research,  network 
cooperation and questions about the nature of their influence. 
- Set 3: Questions about UN meetings: Same as the above, but focused on their methods at 
the UN meetings. 
-  Set 4:  Information:  These questions were about any additional relevant information on 
political influence, as well as additional documents and the possibility of corroborating sources.28 
This  project  will  rely heavily on the informant's  answers  to  these questions,  meaning their  own 
perception of what their goals, strategies and methods are. There is little to corroborate their view, 
apart from the findings of other studies which have interviewed lobbyists in similar, but not identical, 
settings. In the present study, the findings of Keck and Sikkink will serve this purpose, though the 
cases  used  by  them  are  different.  While  the  exclusive  input  of  informants  is  indispensable  in 
achieving an understanding of how they work,  this  reliance can also be considered a  limitation. 
Informants were sometimes unsure about how forthcoming they should be, and whenever questions 
were misunderstood and had to be clarified, this would sometimes result in more leading questions. 
The  second  point  in  my triangulation  of  sources  is  document  analysis,  and  the  primary 
sources here are the reports written by the different NGOs, their “Action Circular” and a series of 
confidential,  internal strategy documents (in the form of correspondence) given to me under the 
condition that I  omit some state-specific information.  Additionally,  there are the UN resolutions, 
drafts and so forth, as well as the UN transcripts of member nation's statements at meetings; these, 
however, are not as informative in terms of how the NGOs work. The secondary sources are drawn 
from theory on the matter. There are many problems related to these textual sources, chief among 
which are the lack of objectivity in advocacy related material combined with their exclusivity, which 
entails that there are no outside-sources to corroborate their  content.  Additionally,  NGOs tend to 
overestimate and misrepresent their own political capacity and influence (1998:301). This  raises some ethical concerns, and when  
pressing on issues related to for example internal problems, it is imperative that the trust of interviewees is not betrayed. Therefore, I  
will present them with the collected data before it is submitted, so that they can object to any misrepresented facts. 
28 The full list of questions is contained in the appendix.
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update  their  online  material  retroactively,  without  keeping  a  history  of  previous  editions  of 
documents. Consequently, it is difficult to trace the developments backwards in time. In terms of 
sources and triangulation, it would seem that my intern-ship could be construed both as a source, in  
terms of participant observation, and as a bias – this will be discussed below (3.2). I will of course 
not use any documents that are in breach of the non-disclosure agreement in the employment contract 
from my intern-ship. I will use only public documents and documents given to me by informants 
with explicit permissions as to their use.   
3.1.3 - Design, problem statement, limiting the unit of analysis
Robert K. Yin, in his book Case Study Research, Design and Methods, describes the research design 
of case studies in five especially important components: “1. a study's questions, 2. its propositions, if 
any, 3.its unit(s) of analysis, 4. the logic linking the data to the propositions, and 5. the criteria for 
interpreting the findings” (Yin, 1994:20).  Since this case study is to a certain extent exploratory, the 
initial  hypotheses  and research  questions  were revised  several  times and are now limited  to  the 
interrogative  problem  statement  and  the  broader  questions  covered  in  the  introduction.   The 
propositions  are  essentially  covered  in  the  theory  chapter,  and  regarding  the  logic  linking  the 
propositions to the data, the analysis will be structured and guided by the different forms of political 
influence that  were discussed in the theory chapter.  The propositions from theory will  then also 
constitute  the  criteria  for  interpreting  the  findings.  The main  strategy is  to  answer  the  problem 
statement  by  comparing  the  propositions  from theory  (2.3)  with  the  data  from informants  and 
document analysis (chapter 4), revising the theory as needed (chapter 5). 
According to Yin, one of the central points of research questions and hypotheses is to limit the 
unit  of  analysis,  meaning what  constitutes  the  case,  be it  an  individual,  a  neighbourhood or  an 
organization (1994:21). In this case, it is limited by the choice of actors, on the one hand, being 
Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam International, the topic of an Arms Trade Treaty and a 
time-line of two years, from 2008 to 2010, focusing on the bigger meetings at the UN in this period 
(essentially the Open Ended Working Groups and the First Committee meetings of '08 and '09).  The 
unit of analysis is therefore the dynamics of the political influence of these actors in this setting, 
within this given time-frame. 
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3.2 – Validity and reliability
3.2.1 - Validity, generalization
The precise role of reliability and validity is also subject to discussion when it comes to qualitative 
case studies. According to Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2006), it is a misunderstanding that case studies 
(whether qualitative, quantitative or both) are not subject to the same rigor and scientific standard as 
other studies. Flyvbjerg writes that 'the value of the case study will depend on the validity claims that  
researchers can place on their study and the status these claims obtain in dialogue with other validity 
claims in the discourse to which the study is a contribution' (2006:15). Yin breaks the validity of case 
studies down into three different categories, construct validity, internal validity and external validity 
(1994:33). The internal validity of a case study is less relevant when it is descriptive and exploratory, 
as it deals with showing that the causal connections in question are in fact dependent and not merely 
spurious. As for construct validity, it is essentially the question of whether you are measuring what 
you say you are measuring; in this context, it could mean checking to see if what the informants 
claim to be their methods are indeed what they are doing, or checking to see if what they claim as 
accomplishments are really their doing, and not arising coincidentally. According to Yin, the method 
of triangulation of sources, in this case the various textual sources and informants, will ideally lead to 
a convergence of multiple sources of evidence, thereby increasing the construct validity of the case 
study (1994:31).  Secondly,  he maintains,  one should keep the chain of evidence clear in such a 
manner as to allow an external reader (colleague, etc.) the opportunity to trace conclusions back to 
their  premises  and  the  original  sources  (in  this  case,  tape-recordings  of  interviews  and  so  on)
(1994:99). Lastly, he suggests having the case study report reviewed by key informants, which is also 
my intention at the time of writing.  
Though my primary aim is to describe the nature of political influence, the phenomenon is 
inescapably  causal  in  nature  and,  as  such,  causal  inferences  will  occasionally  be  described  or 
implicitly assumed. As the interrogative problem statement entails a descriptive answer, the validity 
of the study does not, however, depend on a causal relationship between one factor and another. As 
was already discussed in the theory,  Bas Arts definition of political influence is a causal one, to  
which he applies the notion of a counterfactual approach in determining it's validity. While I will  
touch upon this  in  my analysis,  my goal  as  such  is  not  measurement  of  the  extent  of  political 
influence as much as analysis of the forms in which it is conducted. In the type of case studied here –  
i.e. a descriptive one - Yin suggests pattern-matching as a way to ensure internal validity through the 
use of theory – this was described above, in 3.1.29
29 On a related note is the issue of what kind of causality one can expect to find. Borrowing some terms from Black (1999), the  
causality that is present in qualitative studies such as this one, is molar as opposed to micromeditative (1999:13).  By this is is meant  
that any causality involved is sure to include a host of variables which, although they have a place as apparent identifiable contributors  
in the causal chain, are in reality indirect and operative only on the macro level. This is, however, basically what make up manifest  
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The third form of validity is to do with the possibility of generalization, a controversial point 
in the case of single-case case-studies.  The possibility of generalization from a paradigmatic case 
study is subject to debate. According to Flyvbjerg, 'the strategic choice of case may greatly add to its 
generalizability as a case study' (2006:226). In the example of the critical case, the generalizability is 
obvious. Case studies are, according to him, especially useful in falsification; using Popper's famous 
example, he explains how case studies often reveal the so called “black swan”, which might have 
appeared  white  had  there  not  been an  in-depth  analysis  (2006:228).   In  the  event  that  this  is  a  
paradigmatic  case,  the  hope is  that  the  analysis  will  highlight  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
general political dynamics in question. In a sense it could then be viewed as a prototype for these 
kinds of cases. It is hard to know this beforehand, though, as stated before, because of the intuition 
involved in choosing paradigmatic cases. It is important to note that it is hard to know in advance 
whether one's case is extreme, critical and/or paradigmatic; it would depend not only on discoveries 
in the data gathering and analysis, but also on the theory applied; if one finds propositions in the 
theory that the case falsifies, for example, it is suddenly critical in relation to that theory, or if it 
significantly deviates without any logical connection, it is an extreme case. Flyvbjerg also argues that 
formal generalization is not the only valuable form of knowledge; purely descriptive case studies can 
also contribute to scientific innovation, and in the process of testing theory in terms of seeing which 
theory will best explain the case at hand (2006:227).   
Yin  makes  a  distinction  between  two  types  of  generalization,  which  to  him explain  the 
external validity of the case study (1994:36). Additionally, it  addresses the misunderstanding that 
case studies are not suitable for generalization, which according to him is based on implicitly using 
survey research as a point of contrast. This is a false comparison in as much as survey research relies  
on statistical generalization, whereas the case study largely relies on  analytical generalization, in 
much the same way that experiments do: 'In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to 
generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory' (Yin, 1994:36). But this generalization is 
not automatic, according to Yin, and the findings need to be replicated in further studies; in other 
words, he is slightly more critical to the potential for generalization than Flyvbjerg. The main point 
of Yin is that one can generalize to theory, in stead of from one case to another case. In either case,  
though, it is clear that there is potential for generalization in a single-case study; the exact level of 
generalizability contained in this study will be discussed in chapter five. 
human behavior. On the other hand there is the micromediation level of causality, which is the actual causal level in a microscopic  
sense (Black, 1999:13). The point of this, in this context, is that molar causality, although it can 'often accurately represent reality in a  
way that is intuitively or obviously meaningful […] the outcome variables are usually contingent on other conditions, [and] they tend  
to be best described in probabilistic terms' (Black, 1999:13). In other words, because of the holistic nature of the causal variables  
involved, it is almost impossible to find definite causal relations. 
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3.2.2 - Reliability, Bias
 
Reliability in qualitative studies entails an openness about your process, making sure to document 
procedures and decisions in such a way that they could be repeated (Yin, 1994:38). This is also given 
a large role by Holliday, who describes rigor in qualitative research as showing the workings of the 
research,  putting  weight  on  the  importance  of  transparency  (2007:21).  Consequently,  to  ensure 
reliability one must take care to meticulously state the methodological choices and use of sources in 
order  that  the  points  of  access  to  the  information  can  be  recreated,  and to  maintain  clarity and 
transparency in all the interpretative decisions that are made. The general way to ensure reliability, 
writes Yin, is to make as many steps as operational as possible 'and to conduct research as if someone 
were  always  looking  over  your  shoulder'  (1994:37).  He  gives  an  analogy  from  book-keeping, 
wherein one makes calculations in a manner so that an auditor could repeat the procedures and arrive 
at the same results. 
The end goal of reliability, writes Yin, is both to minimize errors and bias (1994:36). As stated 
earlier, I worked as an intern for Amnesty International Norway in the fall of '08. While this could be 
seen as a form of participant observation, it must be noted that the campaign work I helped with then 
was exclusively local and national, and as such is of limited relevance to the issues raised in this 
study. Among the relevant experience taken from this intern-ship, would primarily be insight into 
how campaigns are executed on the micro-level and how the structure of  the organization operates; 
that is to say,  the somewhat hierarchical ladder from the international secretariat,  to the national 
headquarters and down to the local branches – seen from below, as it were. I was not involved in any 
UN-directed work, and mostly did smaller tasks in relation to a campaign they had toward making 
the Norwegian state implement measures against violence toward women in refugee centers. This 
could conceivably give rise to bias when researching the same organization that I previously worked 
for, but it is not the main goal of this study to discuss whether or not they should have (more or less)  
political influence in the UN. This is certainly an interesting question, particularly in light of the 
normative debates in the English School as regards solidarism, pluralism and sovereignty; it is also a 
question to which my own answer, in writing this, would be very much undecided. 
The main thing,  according to Yin,  is  to have an attitude where you are open to contrary 
findings (1994:59). This is especially important when researching a non-profit organization; one is 
likely to ascribe them normative qualities that no organization can live up to in an environment often 
drenched with Realpolitik and practical compromise.  Flyvbjerg tries to counter what he thinks is a 
false belief about case studies: “The bias toward verification is general [in science], but the alleged 
deficiency of the case study and other qualitative methods is that they ostensibly allow more room 
for the researcher’s subjective and arbitrary judgement than other methods: They are often seen as 
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less  rigorous  than  are  quantitative,  hypothetico-deductive  methods.”  (Flyvbjerg,  2006:16).  
According to Flyvbjerg, meta-studies on case studies have shown that they lean more toward 
falsification than verification, owing largely to the nature of field-work; the case study, apparently, 
forces on the researcher circumstances that run counter to his or her preconceived notions. Moreover, 
one is more likely to be confronted by the context of the field, i.e. interviewees, who might correct 
subjective mistakes (Flyvbjerg, 2006:235-236). Furthermore, the detachment from context can be a 
detriment in quantitative studies as opposed to in-depth, qualitative studies, where the researcher will 
often  have  his  preconceptions  corrected  by  the  environment  or  the  subjects  he  is  researching 
(2006:236). This was certainly the case with my field-work.
The preceding chapter  has detailed the methodological  choices  made in  this  study,  starting with 
methodological theory on single-case studies, the qualitative, iterative approach and the concept of 
pattern-matching (3.1.1). Next, the choice of case was discussed in relation to paradigmatic cases, 
along with problematical aspects of my field-work and an overview of my use of sources (3.1.2).  
3.1.3 presented the design of the study and the limiting of the unit of analysis. In 3.2.1, problems 
regarding validity and case studies were discussed, with focus on the problem of generalization in 
single-case studies. Lastly, issues relating to reliability and bias were discussed with regard to my 
role and the general attitude toward transparency and contrary findings. 
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Chapter 4 – Analysis
This chapter contains a presentation and an analysis of the main points in the gathered data, starting 
with general information on campaigning and advocacy, NGO access in the UN, NGO cooperation 
and  external  opposition,  4.1.  These  are  the  required  presuppositions  to  an  understanding  of  the 
various  ways  in  which  transnational  advocacy networks  seek  political  influence  at  the  UN,  the 
typology of which is discussed in 4.2, along with anomalous data. Their work in both the preparation 
before and in their presence at the UN will be presented and discussed in terms of goals, problems 
and methods for overcoming these problems, as well as in relation to the various hypotheses from 
theory. 
4.1 – Campaigning and Advocacy
4.1.1 - Further notes on structure of analysis
Regarding the use of the stages discussed in regime theory, it would be intuitive to use these  on the 
ATT process as a whole; starting perhaps with agenda formation as occurring sometime between 
2000 and 2006, and negotiations as occurring either in the major UN meetings between 2006-2012 or 
simply in the final meeting in 2012. In this study they will be used on a smaller scale. The strategies  
and forms of influence falling under the heading of agenda formation, will be understood as any 
work done before a major event at the UN; provided that there has been changes in either the agenda, 
the challenges to the agenda, the position of actors or a change in actors interest. Correspondingly, 
what falls under the heading of negotiation (compare table 2.1 in chapter 2.3.1), will be applied to the 
NGO work done in direct relation to the bigger UN meetings.30 The main reason for this is that from 
the point of view of NGOs, agenda formation corresponds to the campaigning initiatives taken when 
preparing for their presence at the UN (all the more so as there are different diplomats present every 
time, and the same process has to be repeated), and negotiation tactics correspond more or less to the  
direct lobbying toward diplomats/government capitols that is undertaken during the month-long UN 
meetings.31 
Initial attempts at structuring the material in relation to the various stages discussed by both 
regime-, negotiation- and NGO theory failed for these and other reasons. Keck and Sikkink, being 
30 While this is compatible with the theory of Keck & Sikkink, it is more at odds with regime theory, wherein the natural thing 
would be to use a macro-perspective and put all the work done so far on the ATT, between 2003-2010, either wholly in the agenda  
formation phase, or wholly in the negotiation phase, depending on whose perspective you adopt (i.e. NGOs or states). In the UN, as of 
2010, the work done by the Open-Ended Working Group is refered to as preparatory negotiations, and negotiations as the single  
meeting planned for 2012. Put simply, the classification becomes problematical given the time-frame of this study and the unit of  
analysis. 
31 This is one of the main reasons that  this  study will  put  emphasis  on NGO specific  theory as opposed to regime- and  
negotiation theory; the latter might be more useful in a study with the scope, resources and time to cover the whole length of a treaty  
formation (made all the more difficult by the fact that NGO employees will have quit and new ones been hired, making access to  
informants impractical). 
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familiar with this problem, uses the word stages of network influence as interchangeable in their text 
with that of  types  of network influence; the reason they chose the former as a primary term was 
because stages, or types, 1-3 sometimes help facilitate stages 4-5 (1998:26). As discovered during the 
data-gathering, NGOs constantly refresh their position and so repeat the stages at either the same or a 
new level/setting. A fitting example of this is to be found in an case from Keck and Sikkink - though 
used by them in a different context - where they discuss the development of campaigns regarding 
violence against women: These networks started out framing the debate as a human rights debate, 
which required 'privileging lawyers and legal expertice' to an extent they were not prepared to, and so 
they reframed it into a question of health (1998:198). In sum, while both an intuitive and accessible  
way of handling the data, these stages are not representative of the findings and, as such, the material  
will instead be presented thematically and typologically. 
4.1.2 - Additional information on informants; employment, tasks
When asked what they were tasked with doing in relation to either the Control Arms Campaign or the 
Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, inf#1 produces research, 'some of which is empirical, about 
arms transfers, trading, tracking', which forms part of his wider research and responsibilities covering 
military, security and policing issues at AI. This role also has policy and advocacy work attached to 
it; specifically attending government meetings, and to 'liaise with governments in terms of detailed 
policy work'.32  He then added that there are two different kinds of research, one which is empirical  
about arms transfers and their impact, and another which is about national regulations and rules, the 
policy positions of different states, and so on, which is separate.33  
Inf#2 replied that since he is the program officer at IANSA, he is the main contact for ATT 
and CAC work, and  even though his role is quite varied, a lot of his time is spent working on ATT 
related work such as management- and campaign meetings. Inf#3 said that she is fairly new to the 
role, having only been at this post since the preceding summer, and that her tasks have been event-
oriented around the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN in July, as well as the UN 
General  Assembly.  In  this  respect  she  has  ' been  devising  advocacy  strategy,  dividing  and 
implementing advocacy strategy at both of those', as well as having the coordinating responsibility 
for  the  Amnesty  International  delegation  of  lobbyists.  Additionally,  she  is  the  convener  of  the 
working  group  of  the  ATT Steering  Committee.34 Inf  #4  is  the  Advocacy  Officer  at  Amnesty 
32 When asked whether this was more to do with preparatory work than hands-on advocacy, he replied that all the research is  
campaign oriented, and that everything will be 'seeking to feed into the Control Arms Campaign, which is probably the largest part of  
my work'.
33 Hereafter, informants will be referred to as Inf#1-inf#5 in lieu of initials, as they are shared in one case and, furthermore, might be  
too revealing given the positions in the NGO. Regarding these positions, they are not entirely exclusive to the informants (in all  
cases but one) and can therefore be included while still keeping reasonable anonymity. In any case, I was given permission to refer  
to their position in the NGO.  
34 Informants #1-3 confirmed that they have all participated in agenda formation before the UN meetings, campaigning and  
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International  Sweden,  and has  previously worked as  a  lobbyists  at  the New York office.  She  is 
currently working on this as well as other  campaigns in a regional capacity. Inf #5 is the Head of 
Control Arms at Oxfam International; she has been working on the campaign in various capacities 
since it's inception, and as the Campaign Manager since 2006. Inf # 6 is a Control Arms campaigner 
at  AI,  who has  been working on and off  on various  campaigns 'for  a  few years',  and  who has  
frequently been to New York for events at the UN. 
4.1.3 - Campaigning and advocacy
Even though all informants agree that the two are necessarily linked, they still operate with a clear 
distinction  between  lobbying  or  advocacy,  on  the  one  hand,  and  campaigning on  the  other.  In 
explaining  the  use  of  these  terms,  inf#1's  says  that  campaigning  is  regarded  as  getting  popular 
mobilization  in  order  to  create  political  influence,  whereas  actually  using  that  weight  he  would 
consider to be lobbying or advocacy. Their general meaning seems to be that campaigning is directed 
at mass mobilization, whereas advocacy or, as they more commonly refer to it,  direct lobbying is 
directed at government officials. 
On the relationship between campaigning and direct lobbying, inf#3 says that they are 'much 
more heavily focused on direct lobbying than it used to be' and that while they were more focused on 
international campaigning at  the outset,  they 'got to a point  where governments agree that  there 
should be an ATT, so they agreed to come to the table, and now what's important is the substance of 
it, ensuring that the detail is going to achieve the things that we want to see from an ATT'. She adds 
that the relevant venue for changing the detail of a treaty is high level advocacy, and that this 'phasing 
of  the  process'  is  done partly  on  account  of  limited  resources,  or  'distribution  of  organizational 
priorities', and partly based on what, she says, makes sense.  According to inf#2, the members of 
IANSA themselves – as opposed to the secretariat – are split between capital targeted lobbying and 
campaigning. The two activities are closely tied, he says, and 'there might be sixty groups that did 
kind of grass roots campaigning, marches, post cards, petition campaigns, but then there's probably 
another sixty that had seminars, met their local politicians, they understand the policy, and they speak 
on a kind of higher level to specific targets as opposed to a general public campaigning initiative'.35 
lobbying  during the meetings and that they have participated to some degree in the research leading up to them.
35 Regarding the bigger campaigning initiatives, such as the million faces petition, inf #2 points out that it got a lot of media  
attention when it was presented to Kofi Annan. The problem with these kinds of media-related campaigning initiatives, he says, is that  
it's impossible to measure how effective they are. They regard it as a relative success, however, since it played an important role in  
drawing attention toward the issue, something that he says is hard to do these days 'with nuclear stuff, climate change everywhere' and  
the ATT being a rather slow and technical process that does 'not affect people in the north too much'.
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4.1.4 - Network access to arena, Visibility
A necessary condition for understanding NGO influence at the UN is figuring out how much access 
they have to this arena; political influence is dependent on access to the relevant political arena. In 
talking about their general situation at the UN, inf #2 and #3 say that they basically make do with 
what they can get from day to day, and that they 'just kind of go into an empty meeting room, and use 
one of them'  (inf#2).  They will  put up stands in the hallways,  projectors displaying videos,  and 
various events. While they have no formal position, they will find ample venue to promote their 
cause;   and  most  states,  he  says,  are  quite  accommodating  when  approached  by  an  NGO 
representative. Inside the governmental meeting venues, there is seeting along the side and in the 
back for NGO members to sit on, inf#3 says, 'and a lot of the time it's about working the room, 
making  sure  you're  capturing  the  right  people,  NGOs  sometimes  go  around  and  speak  to 
governments at their desk, just crouching down by their desk'. 
There is some competition between the CAC and other NGOs regarding booking space, inf#3 
says,  and she  adds  that  they rely heavily on IANSA and Oxfam who have better  facilities  and 
coordinators within the UN framework and the UN facilities management. The main challenge here, 
she says, is that there is 'a hell of a lot of bureaucracy involved, you have to go through about four  
different compartments to organize catering and you know, get security to agree that it's OK to do 
this 'n that'.   This is one of the reasons, she says,  why they spend a whole month in New York 
whenever there is a meeting. In OEWG and UNFC meetings, inf#1 says, there will be a point at 
which the meeting is at an end, in the afternoon, where the meeting will be 'suspended and the NGOs 
will be given an allotted time to speak, and that's the only point at which we're able to intervene 
formally in a meeting'. 
All informants mention visibility in the UN area as an important priority and as requirement if 
their  methods are  to  be effective.  Inf#1 gives  an example of the first  committee of  the General 
Assembly, 'where there's dozens and dozens of issues on the agenda [...], they will be dealing with 
everything from stockpiles to weapons in outer space, nuclear disarmament, to all kinds of things'. 
They are "jostling for bandwidth" he says, and he attributes the success of their cause in the October 
First Committee meeting to the visibility of the campaign. During this month long meeting, he says, 
their issue will get discussed for a relatively short time, so it's essential to get the most out of side 
meetings and government meetings; this presupposes visibility in the UN. 
Historically, explains inf#1, the campaign has used everything from media stunts 'all the way 
through to you know, if you like, the most basic tool in the lobbyists toolkit is having coffee with 
somebody'. The NGOs are able to book a room during, for example, lunch time, where they can have 
meetings and present reports. How many delegates show up at their meetings, he adds, depends on 
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everything  from  how  provocative  the  subject  is  to  the  quality  of  sandwiches  made  available; 
generally, he says, there will be anything from 50-100 delegates and that they are getting attention.36 
Inf#1, #4 and #6 all talked about the importance of places such as the Vienna Café and the 
various  lounges/cafeterias,  explaining  how  meaningful  interaction  with  the  diplomats  is  often 
spontaneous,  and  that  they  therefore  place  great  importance  on  being  constantly  prepared  and 
educated on the action circulate and country-specific strategies. The quality of the catering, explains 
inf#4, is often just as important as stands and events. In sum, though they for the most part have to 
improvise and make due with what is available at any given time, and though they are not always  
given  formal  recognition,  they  have  ample  venue  to  promote  their  cause  and  are  accepted  and 
respected by most states as participants, often being mentioned in their statements in plenary.37 Their 
access  to  this  arena  is  more  indirect  than  that  of  states,  confirming Bas Arts  statements  on the 
definition of an arena, but they are in no way denied access, nor are they lacking in opportunities to 
be heard (see 2.2.1). Because the interaction in this arena is spontaneous for lobbyists, if follows that 
they need to be very well informed; this is related to information politics, as discussed in 4.2.1.  
4.1.5 - Network cooperation, internal and external opposition
With regard to cooperation with the other NGOs, inf#3 was asked whether they make decisions 
together or if AI – as arguably the biggest NGO in the ATT SC – makes decisions unilaterally and 
then give the other NGOs the option to either get onboard or make objections. She replied that it was 
a mixture of both, and that AI was there to ensure that the ATT is effective in preventing human 
rights abuses, while Oxfam has a development focused agenda, for example, so they would naturally 
develop and pursue their own objectives first. This is mitigated by regular campaign management 
meetings between the Control Arms partners and with the ATT SC on a weekly basis, she says,  
adding that the many events during the year require constant coordination. Her job as both campaign 
coordinator for AI and convener of the ATT SC, is to 'divide the gap of advocacy strategy, ensuring 
that all of the NGOs are feeding into the strategy' which will then be implemented in New York. In  
terms of  strategic portrayal, they are focusing on the internal aspect as well as the external one; 
trying to achieve frame resonance both within the network itself and towards recipients (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998:8).
36 Another  tactic  they use,  according  to  inf#3,  is  to  organize  big  meetings  with  the  whole  NGO delegation  and  certain 
governments, where they get forty or fifty people asking for an audience with the government; this allows them, in turn, to get an 
engagement where difficult questions can be asked. They will also put other governments in the room at the time, which she says can 
be useful. Side events are also used, where they bring speakers to the UN in order to raise their issues and to illustrate why, she says,  
they are calling on the governments to take certain action. Generally, she says, they try to always make themselves visible by putting 
up photo selections, holding receptions with drinks, all of this to 'invite the diplomats along'.
37 Essentially this is up to the member states to determine in preparatory commissions of negotiation, most likely in the "prepcoms" 
of 2010 if it becomes an issue. See Bas Arts (1998:108) for various examples of treaties where NGOs were given and were not 
given formal recognition in resolutions. 
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Inf#1 confirms that there tends to be strategy coordination before the bigger UN meetings, 
which has 'increasingly tended to be not just the three large NGOs, but it tends to be working groups 
from the ATT steering committee'. When asked if there is any friction between the NGOs in the 
build-up, he says that it's important to distinguish between strategy and goals. According to him, the 
ATT SC successfully sketched out a set of goals very early on, the Global Principles, that all the 
NGOs signed up to and have as 'a shared vision', stating that while there are many points in this set of 
principles  that  are  controversial  for  governments,  there  is  little  contention  within  the  NGO 
community.38  Inf#2 says that there are often, if not always, slight disagreements with "positioning", 
associated  materials  that  someone  will  not  sign  on  to  on  account  of  disagreement  over  facts, 
disagreement over the accuracy of some reports, and issues around 'who should go, why they should 
go, not between ourselves, but people from around the world'. He says that NGOs are quite good at 
'arguing amongst themselves', adding that it would be odd if there were no active discussions. These 
were all just minor issues, in his opinion, and he couldn't think of anything noteworthy. Inf #1 and #2 
both said that it came down to the NGOs having a slightly different focus.
Inf#3 stated that she was unsure about how frank to be in an interview like this, and went on 
to say that inevitably there are disagreements about policy. It's difficult, she says, when you have so 
many stakeholders involved, noting that an effect of this is that they have conversations that 'go on 
and on and on and wastes a lot of time, going around in circles about trying to devise a political 
action or come up with our perspective on resolution texts etc.'. Adding to this is the restructuring of 
the campaign, both with regard to Control Arms and the ATT SC, with problems coming up in terms 
of the clarification of roles that will be played by the different parties in working groups and boards. 
She distinguishes between these problems as related to decision-making, and says that there are also 
problems with regard to facts, 'so for example publication of statistics where one organization uses 
statistics that another doesn't think are valid' which causes disagreements. Inf#3 emphasized that they 
make sure to have strong joint objectives, so that each NGO can pursue their own objectives without 
it disturbing cooperation. 
 According  to  inf  #1,  while  there  is  general  agreement  upon  goals,  there  are  frequent 
arguments about strategy, and in the case of the last big meeting (i.e October '09) it was primarily to 
do with negotiation strategy vis-a-vis the US position on the treaty.  But, he says,  they ended up 
having a coordinated view, a joint statement and a joint lobbying position, as replied inf #2 and #3. 
He further adds that the NGOs 'weren't clearly split along NGO lines',  and that the conflict was 
mainly between individuals.39 Inf #1 at first replied that there was no clear hierarchy of influence 
38 He adds that many new issues have come up after the initial formulation of the principles, but that none of these have entailed  
friction between the NGOs; it is mostly a matter, he says, of them having a different focus. When pressed on the matter, he said that  
'obviously sometimes people disagree', and that the process of drawing up such a document is 'a little complex', but that the set of  
principles is 'pretty stable'.
39 This is analogous to findings by Manno, who writes that 'personalities will often play as much, if not more of a role in  
international environmental negotiations than the organizations and positions the individuals represent' (1994:108).
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between the NGOs in settling these disputes or deciding policy, but then said that the smaller NGOs 
often look to the three larger NGOs for a lead.  In the end, according to all three informants, it is the 
bigger, richer organizations that 'have more say because they have more stuff, capacity, etc., so they 
can do more work' (inf#1).40
Keck and Sikkink point out that transnational advocacy networks operate within a political 
space internally as well as externally, which entails that coming up with a joint enterprise will require 
internal negotiation (1999:90)(2.2.4). As pointed out, the political space in this case is two-fold as it 
pertains  both  to  the  different  official  political  aims  of  the  NGOs  involved  and  the  cultural 
backgrounds of their members; the assumption being that for the core actors to continuously develop 
a "common frame of meaning" would be especially difficult (compare Keck and Sikkink 1998:7-8). 
This did not seem to be the case, though they did run into some contention as regards credibility and 
political ties, as discussed below (4.2.1).  The CAC seems to have successfully framed the issue,  
achieving frame resonance  with  regard  to  themselves  and the  arena  (i.e.  the  two-fold  nature  of 
"strategic portrayal", compare 2.2.4), despite problems in the process. 
Regarding external opposition in both the preparation phase and at the UN, inf#1 explains how it is a 
problem for them that some governments treat NGOs as a single block of actors, and that some have 
quite a 'detailed and disaggregated view of the NGO community', in that some governments like 
Oxfam, some like AI and so on, while others won't distinguish and treat them all as a single actor. 
This is a general problem, and in terms of specifically the ATT, he cites Egypt as the most vocal  
opponent. According to inf#1, there's a block of states behind Egypt who are opposed to the ATT, all 
of them abstaining from voting. Zimbabwe is currently the only one voting no, having changed their 
vote a few times, but according to him it is unclear to everyone else whether this vote was simply a 
mistake on their part 'or if it was the other way around'.41 Among the abstaining states behind Egypt, 
he adds, some are merely unsure about the nature of the ATT and the process leading up to it, while 
others are fundamentally opposed to it. Voting no, however, is perceived as a drastic thing to do in 
the UN, and often states will obstain 'when what they mean is we think this thing stinks'. Behind 
Egypt, he says,  are 'Venezuela, Cuba, quite a lot of the Arab League, Russia is still pretty skeptical, 
China is very quiet, so there's a kind of silent group of states, block of states [...] who tends to speak 
out through Egypt'. 
According to inf#2 sympathetic governments will cooperate in what he describes as beneficial 
40 Inf #2 had rougly the same thing to say about the relationship between strategy and goals,  adding that developing the  
common goals takes a bit of discussion, but that it's dispensed beforehand and that everyone is in agreement when taking it to the UN.  
According to inf #2, the three NGOs are clear on not ignoring the other organization's concerns when applying their own focus in  
presentations toward government representatives. There is no real contradiction here, he adds, saying that 'if you take guns away from 
the world, you'll probably see an increase in people's human rights, because then they'll not be attacked and killed and living in bad  
conditions because they're scared of being robbed'. 
41  Inf#2 explains that only Zimbabwe votes no, and that everyone thinks they'll change their position once it gets down to the  
final vote, and that there is also speculation that this might be an anti-colonial sentiment on their part toward the UK.  
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groups of supportive states, who will work out strategies to promote their views among the other 
states.  There  will,  however,  be  some  points  on  which  the  NGOs  will  not  agree  with  even  the 
progressive states, he points out. Regarding opposition from nations, inf#3 says that they are more 
inclined to  ignore the NGOs rather than publicly oppose them, but that they speak against  their 
principles when addressing the sympathetic nations. 
Regarding opposition  from other  interest  groups,  inf#1 cites  the  NRA as  the  most  vocal 
opponent of the ATT besides states, along with other domestic gun control NGOs.42 According to 
inf#1,  they are  opposed to  it  for  fraudulent  reasons;  the  ATT is  explicitly  avoiding any control 
restrictions on domestic circulation of arms, he says, so it's irrelevant to their causes. Nevertheless, 
they think it will become a much bigger problem for them now that the US is coming aboard; the  
NRA and affiliates, he says, are already using phone polls in the states, and in spite of their focus on 
domestic policy they are given equal access with the Control Arms NGOs in the UN. 43 
As mentioned before, NGOs have an opportunity to formally intervene when a meeting is at 
an end. In these situations, he explains, the UN is scrupulous about giving equal time to the Control 
Arms NGOs and the NRA and sports shooters associations, where each is given half an hour to 
present their case. According to inf#1, this is not fair as they represent a massive global movement 
whereas the NRA is a national gun control lobby. 44 Inf#3 says that gun lobbies have a lot of presence 
at the UN and that they publish articles and blogs 'rubbishing what we say'. She also laments the fact  
that  pro  gun  lobbies  are  given  an  equal  time  to  present  their  case  in  the  main  chambers  of 
governments.45 Inf#4  and  #6  both  cite  experience  with  opposition  from  gun  control  lobby 
organizations such as the NRA, generally saying the same things as inf #1-3. Inf#4, having worked at 
the  New  York  office,  claims  that  threats  are  frequent  and  that  the  ATT is  one  of  their  more 
controversial issues.  
42 National Rifle Association, an NGO that works to protect the Second Amendment in the US Bill of Rights, i.e. promotion of 
firearm ownership rights. 
43 When asked if he thought they were funded by other lobbying actors who had interests in arms dealing, inf#1 replied that  
they have seen no evidence for that, and that while it might be the case, he thought the NRA were just 'fundamentally and ideologically  
opposed to any kind of restrictions on weaponry' and that they are 'very well organized and well funded'.
44 Inf#2 had mostly the same thing to say about the NRA, but – in representing IANSA – did not want to be quoted directly in  
talking about them. According to inf#1 and #3, IANSA is villified by the NRA to the extent that threats are made. Inf#2 does say that 
while the NRA is the largest voice, there are lobbyists from the weapon industry as well, though usually not in the UN – they will  
lobby governments in separate meetings
45 When asked if she too felt that they are wrongfully adressing export issues as domestic NGOs, she replied that while this is  
the argument they use, the NRA public liaisons will reply that the ATT adresses restrictions on the sale of guns which will threaten the  
right to bear arms. While this is certainly not the facts of the ATT, she says, it seems that some of them genuinely believe it to be.
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4.2 – Typology on political influence
As presented in 2.3.1, Keck and Sikkink have developed a four point typology to account for the 
political  influence of transnational advocacy networks,  understood as forms of persuasion (or,  in 
some cases, socialization) and consisting of information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics  
and accountability politics  (1999:95). These tools of analysis will be applied to the gathered data 
(4.2.1 – 4.2.3), pointing out anomalies (4.2.4) and which methods the informants themselves deem 
more influential (4.2.5).    
4.2.1 – Information politics and credibility
In terms of the typology of Keck and Sikkink, the largest part of the gathered data can be categorized 
in terms of information politics. My findings regarding the role of information and the problems 
relating to it are, however, not completely congruent with their typology. The aim of this section is to  
see  how  much  of  my  gathered  data  can  be  understood  using  their  description  of  this  type  of 
influence, which is centered around the effective use of information at the right time and in the right 
venues, the appropriate framing of issues and credibility (1999:95-96)(compare 2.3.1). Though I rely 
primarily  on  informants  as  sources,  I  was  given  prints  of  a  significant  portion  of  AI's  internal 
correspondence from September-November of 2009, with permission to use most of it; some portions 
were marked as confidential, having to do with country-specific strategies, and I was instructed not 
specifically name persons from either the NGO or governments. Granting these exceptions, it was 
left to my own discretion.  
Inf#3 explains how the general idea of the material they prepare is to get a plausible idea 
across of how the global principles of a treaty would have to be to ensure human rights, and how it 
has to be in order to properly work. Their main concern at the OEWG of July '09, says inf#1, was 
centered around 'the issue of the scope of what states were willing to accept as the scope of weaponry 
to be included in an arms trade treaty'; i.e., if it was going to be just the seven categories of the UN 
register  on  conventional  arms,  with  additions,  if  ammunition,  parts,  components  and production 
machinery were to be included. Their strategy was to get a number of NGOs to prepare their research 
on the human rights implications of the above mentioned arms, to 'really nail down the scope of the  
issue' and prepare documents, briefings and reports about the necessary scope of the treaty, i.e. 'the 
way that different kinds of equipment are implicated in human rights violations' to make the case that 
they need to be included within international controls. This echoes what Keck and Sikkink describe 
as showing that a state of affairs is 'neither natural nor accidental', in so far as it is caused by the use 
of these arms in human rights violations, as well as the importance of identifying responsibility, in 
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this case lack of international regulation, and, lastly, proposing credible solutions (1999:96). 
In terms of producing politically usable information,  IANSA are responsible  for collating 
everything that's being said in the UN by states, which results in regional papers that can be used for 
reference (such as consistency of arguments, etc.). This is especially relevant, according to inf#2, 
when states are asked to submit their views on the ATT to the UN Secretary General. This will feed 
back into their members in capitals, who can then confront their government representatives about 
what was said or promised earlier. When asked whether they used Amnesty reports to this end, he 
replied  that  they  used  them  as  tools,  especially  useful  when  representatives  speak  to  their 
governments. It's a useful reference, he says, so they 'can say things like, you know, this Amnesty 
report says that in Guinea, these weapons are being transferred there and they're used for killing 
people, with this ATT it wouldn't have happened'. He further feels that since it would have Amnesty 
International written on it, this would add credibility. 
Credibility is a huge concern according to all  informants,  especially with regard to being 
politically neutrals. Concerning political affiliations, inf#1 said that to his knowledge, none of the 
NGOs involved in the Campaign are affiliated to a political party, have a political purpose or are 
political think tanks. He then adds that AI's distance from political parties is 'more than some others' 
in  the  sense  that  they  'don't  get  any  funding  from  any  government',  whereas  a  number  of 
organizations (presumably from the ATT SC) are funded substantially by different governments.46
Inf#2 replied that 'of course it involves politics in dealing with governments', but that there is 
no political agenda behind what they're doing and that their 'bottom line is saving lives'. He points to 
the ATT's Global Principles, claiming that they are not political or politically motivated, but more 
about falling in line with international  law and sustainable development.  While  there are certain 
governments that support them more than others, this does not, according to him, entail that they take 
instructions from these governments. He adds that the ATT process is perceived as led by the UK, 
being one of the countries that the NGOs are largely in agreement with, but that even in this case the 
NGOs will voice their disagreements. As far as government affiliation goes, he says that while the 
Control Arms campaign is managed by Oxfam, AI and IANSA, the Control Arms brand is being used 
by NGOs all over the world, many of which will be national and in some cases closely aligned to 
national parties.47 
Inf#3 points to some crossover  with individuals,  who hold positions both in the ATT SC 
NGOs and in their  respective governments;  sometimes even doubling as government-  and NGO 
46  To his mind, this is an interesting kind of "feedback", not neccessarily in terms of influence, but it is the case 'that you have NGOs  
lobbying goverments [...] from whom they are also recieving funds'. In some cases, he says, those funds have been given to them by  
the same government specifically for ATT lobbying, which to him constitutes an interesting "loop". Inf#1 did not think it was a serious  
question of objectivity or credibility, saying that one should not 'overstate the influence that a certain funding brings', but repeats that  
the perceptions of governments and what their strategies are in funding NGOs, who then lobbies them, is an interesting question. 
47He mentions NGOs from Argentina as an example, adding that he is not certain if they are directly influenced or not, and that in any 
case 'you don't get many national parties that are going to say 'we want to break international human rights law, we don't want to follow 
humanitarian law and we want to undermine sustainable development'.   
41
delegates in UN meetings.48 According to her, this is a matter of contention within the coalition, as 
some NGOs – unnamed here –  'and Amnesty has quite different perspectives on that conflict  of 
interest'. The examples become numerous when applied to people who have at some point worked 
for the government, but are now working for NGOs; as far as she knows, however, the crossover is  
more with individuals rather than organizations. Inf#5 also touched upon this subject, claiming that 
people with government ties were more often than not an asset rather than a problem, and that she did 
not perceive this as a significant threat to their credibility. Inf#3 confirmed that they are perceived as 
being  too  close  to  the  UK government,  describing  this  as  a  damaging accusation.  Knowing the 
mechanisms within the campaign, she says, they're 'absolutely not, we're apolitical, but it's inevitable 
that we'll have closer relationships with some governments than others'. 49 
Keck and Sikkink describe information as what binds networks together and as essential for 
their  effectiveness  (1998:18).  This  information  must  be  actionable  and useful  both  to  their  own 
members – who are often scattered around the world – and to the final recipients. A significant part of 
a network's influence in a state-dominated setting arises from the exclusivity of their information 
(1998:19). According to informants 1-3, they have a monopoly on ATT related information in the UN 
setting,  where  diplomats  are  generally  unenlightened  on  the  subject.  How  this  information  is 
received, however, depends on the country's relation to or opinion of the NGO, and therefore it is a  
question of credibility. 
When asked what it is like to mix research and lobbying, or research and activism in general, 
and whether  their  reports  and material  is  regarded by recipients as pure research or whether  it's 
perceived more in terms of activism, inf #1 replied that to his mind this mixture is a strength. It is  
quite helpful, he says, to be able to bring 'the minute detail information about the actual nature of the 
problem and what is actually happening there' to a lobbying environment, or to the UN, where 'they 
more often than not lack this information'. I had assumed at the outset, before the field-work, that 
their credibility would be scrutinized on account of the dramatization of facts that is often associated 
with activism. This, however, did not seem to be the case, and mostly their credibility issues were 
related to bias toward certain states.  
According to Keck and Sikkink, the credibility of a network's information hinges on it being 
well documented and reliable, which is often in conflict with their use of this information to gain 
attention – to this end it must be 'timely and dramatic' (1998:19). In characterizing their work as both 
journalistic and academic, inf#1 says that the information is academic in the sense that it's always 
48 Inf#3 gave examples that are omitted on her request. 
49 Another big concern, according to inf#3, is getting caught up as pawns in government games. They are very careful about  
this, that they are not being used, adding that they are 'wary of how we then take what's going on and in this sort of microcosm, we're  
having sort of confidential discussions with governments all of the time, what we do with that information, what we make public, what  
we don't, how we respond in the media, when do we use our particular tools'. She also cites the example of how they recently issued a 
press release calling on the UK government not to bend to the US demands about the provision. The UK government were absolutely  
furious, she says, because 'it was about taking a sort of internal diplomatic issue outside, that we were trying to use as a campaigning 
technique'. 
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motivated by a campaign and that they are honest about the fact that they have an agenda, while on 
the other hand, it is journalistic 'in the sense of having to be true and accurate'. He puts emphasis on 
the fact that the truth of what they see happening has to be what forms the controls they recommend. 
It's also journalistic, he says, in the sense that they are not 'afraid to name names, if a government is  
doing something you'll say so,  if a company is doing something, as long as we can stack it up with  
evidence, we will say so'. Whether they name individuals is more difficult, and he says it's not always 
their policy to do so. Truthfulness and accuracy are especially important because when dealing with 
specific transfers of governments and companies, he says, if you get the facts 'about what happened 
on that particular day wrong, you'll get sued', and so the standards of accuracy and credibility are 
paramount. 
Their research  is  a  mix  of  statistical  research,  inf  #1 says,  mostly in  terms  of  gathering 
statistics  that  are  already  there,  but  they've  produced  research  about  'the  humanitarian  and 
epidemiological  impact of particular weapons,  types,  numbers of deaths and injuries'  noting that 
these are 'quite powerful things'. The bulk of the research is done by the international secretariat staff, 
and is not decentralized to member countries; they also use consultants around the world, and when 
asked about their background he replies that they are not required to come from academia. It's more 
about their level of expertice, he says, and their access to specific information.50 He explains how 
their general attitude is to gather as much expert information as possible that is relevant to the topic 
of the campaign in question.51 
According to Keck and Sikkink, an 'important part of the political struggle over information is 
precisely whether an issue is defined primarily as technical – and thus subject to consideration by 
"qualified" experts – or as something that concerns a broader global constituency' (1998:19). This is 
why, they say, the clear and powerful messages 'that appeal to shared principles' often have more 
impact than that of experts (1998:19).  Inf #2 said that some reports are more loosely written and 
more sensationalist than others, pointing to the fact that while a lot of campaign materials consist of 
mostly pictures and rhetorical points, some material, such as the global principles booklet, are 'forty 
pages of dense text'. It depends, he says, on how the information is to be used; for some occasions, it  
is more suitable with facts and broad statistics, in others it's more about getting the message across in 
a brief and effective way. 
Inf #3 had a different characterization of their research in that she sees the data gathering in 
50 He says that 'they're not necessarily Ph.Ds', but that the campaign has profited greatly from a core of expertice about the  
mechanics of the international arms trade, which has come from a whole range of disciplines, he says, from 'people who understand  
and  know  about  transportations  or  logistics,  people  who  know  about  weapons,  and  people  who  know  about  public  health,  
epidemiological, drawing upon a number of different disciplines' (inf#1)
51"That was really important, the level of expertise, for other kinds of campaigns, legal expertise is absolutely critical for campaign for 
international criminal court, military engineering expertise for the landmines campaign, because they were bringing evidence to the 
table about the, you know, for example, in the cluster munitions campaign, bringing evidence about failure rates, something the 
Norwegian parts of that campaign did, kind of engineering evidence that the governments can count on, that we have the data. So their 
experise has been really important for us." Inf#1
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campaigns with long term goals as academic, in terms of building data over time, but that the use of 
this data is largely journalistic and that it comes down to using it in the manner that is most useful.52 
This is  consistent with Keck and Sikkink's statement that "reporting facts" does not 'fully express the 
way networks strategically use information to frame issues' and that they 'call attention to issues, or 
even create issues by using language that dramatizes and draws attention to their concerns' (1998:19-
20). 
In talking about the role of information at the UN, inf#2 says that there are a variety of reason 
for sending well-prepared and educated NGO representatives to the UN. Part of it, he says, is to 'keep 
the people there, the governmental representatives there up to date with what's going on, and the 
NGOs are  also  an institutional  memory,  you know these people  in  the  UN change every year'.  
Another reason, he says, is human interest stories and testimonials; if you talk about someone who's 
family has been shot to death or bombed by a tank, he says, 'that's a different kind of pull' – i.e. to  
factual information in statistical form. Instead of flipping pages of writing, he adds, it's better to 
present  people  who  have  survived  attacks  from  conventional  weapons,  conveying  to  the 
governmental representative that 'look, you're a Liberian, I'm a Liberian, my family's been shot to 
death, we need to stand up...'. It's these kind of human tragedy stories, he says, that prove very useful, 
often more so than factually oriented reports. 
Usually, however, inf#2 says that government representatives will need to look at 'numbers 
and money and what it means to their economy and what they currently do, the impact on their  
current  trading  in  arms'.  According  to  Keck  and  Sikkink,  the  linking  of  testimonial  and 
technical/statistical information are part of what characterizes NGO networks, and a method they 
have helped to legitimize (1998:21). Use of individual cases as testimonials and the dramatizing of 
factual information are crucial in increasing an issue's salience in a political setting, but, judging by 
my informants, they seem to be too risky in the absence of facts. 
An invaluable part of the NGO influence at the UN, says inf#2, is that they have expertice 
they make available to governments, whose resources do not permit them to get this expertice. When 
presented with knowledge on an issue, says inf#2, 'if they don't have alternatives, that's what they 
tend to go along with, maybe not all of them, but it forms the basis of their own kind of opinions'.  
This is why, he says, for IANSA, it's a priority to give it's members knowledge about why the ATT is  
relevant  to  them in  their  own countries  and how it  can help,  a  knowledge which  facilitates  the 
influence  they have  when  talking  to  governmental  representatives.  Speaking  from a  position  of 
52 Another effective method, inf#2 says, is whenever the Secretary General calls for consultations 'usually when he puts out 
a call for consultations he'll get twelve, you know, I think when we did it there were over a hundred, the most ever state's 
submissions'. He attributes this to IANSA handing out templates for these submissions to members in different governments; this 
way, it's not demanding on governments time as the real work is prepared by the NGO and they are only required to read it, sign it 
and send it in. In the opinion of inf#1, it is often the more "ephemeral" materials that change a government officials mind, and he 
claims it  is often more effective to have 'a presentation that you can then e-mail to them afterwards, you know, that might be more 
influential than a big fat report that you smack on their desk'. 
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knowledge, he says, is the only way to be persuasive, and simply walking 'along with flyers and 
posters, [...], people look at it and say, oh well you know, OK, but when you get someone talk to you 
and say, we really wanted to do this with human rights law, because this and this, being undermined 
in this way, not all these government people know about that'.
Information politics as a type of political influence seems to give an accurate understanding 
of the network's behaviour in the case at hand; in framing the issue and presenting politically usable 
information; in having a monopoly or exclusivity of information; and in maintaining the most useful 
balance between technical expertice and human interest testimonials. Credibility in the case of the 
ATT, however, seems to have been centered around concerns regarding political neutrality and bias 
toward certain countries, more than towards maintaining credibility with the press, which is what 
Keck and Sikkink highlight  as the most  important  feature (1999:96).  The dramatization of facts 
seems to be construed as a strength, rather than as a potential problem of credibility. And given the 
setting in the UN, the suitability of particular categories of information seem to be evaluated on a 
person-to-person basis, rather than pertaining to the campaign as a whole.    
4.2.2 – Symbolic and accountability politics
The use of symbolic and accountability politics are not as prevalent in this case as one would assume 
it to be in most cases, owing perhaps to the global and bureaucratic nature of the issue. It has already 
been stated how the network sometimes uses testimonials and stories in a symbolic fashion, rather 
than statistics, in order to convince diplomats. There is no clear juxtaposition of symbolic events in 
this case, as there is in the cases of Keck and Sikkink; it is rather a myriad of small examples all  
feeding into the same agenda in a manner more akin to information politics.  Inf#1 explains that 
while it is generally the case that the advocacy agenda dictates the direction of the research – he had 
previously said that preparatory research is derived from advocacy objectives-, it is also true that 
some of the research is  procured indirectly through country specific  crisis  work.  Citing a recent 
experience in Conakry, Guinea, he said that while they sat out to look at the recent massacre that's 
happened there,  they ended up gathering a lot  of information about  the international  systems of 
training that's being supplied to specific units involved in the massacre, and 'a lot about the ongoing 
training of youth militias by South African and Israeli private security companies'. Apparently the 
same thing occurred several times during the cluster munitions campaign, especially with reference 
to Lebanon; he adds that the cluster munitions treaty, sadly, would probably not have come to pass if 
not for that war. Arguably, it acted as a symbol, facilitating political influence. This kind of data will 
be used, he says, to try to advocate for the inclusion of relevant international regulatory systems in 
the arms trade treaty. They use these examples to show the tragedies that occur when the arms trade 
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is handled in a privatized fashion, without international and government enforced regulations. Given 
that  the  real  consequences  are  immeasurable  (their  words),  these examples  are  characterized  by 
informants #1 and #2 as symbolic (albeit not using that exact term). 
As for accountability, it has played a significant part in their strategies toward some specific 
countries. It is of limited use, according to informants #1-3, in that countries will simply deny, ignore 
or otherwise disregard their accusations. The question of how the resulting formulation of the ATT is 
framed, is relevant to it's status as a hard law treaty, inf#1 explains, and it is intended as a legally 
binding  treaty  as  opposed  to  an  agreement.  Making  a  treaty  that  countries  respect  is  not  done 
automatically, he says, citing the example of Russia who is already obligated to a treaty that says they 
are to take into account human rights criteria in considering arms transfers – he says 'it's fair to say 
that Russia export controls interpret that provision very liberally'. Their main concern at this point 
forward, is that it will end up as what Young describes as a dead letter (1998:2), a point on which 
inf#5 elaborated at length, essentially saying that since NGOs have extended experience in trying to 
make states live up to their obligations to international laws and treaties, they are painfully aware of 
the necessity of a strong and specific ATT. With states that care little about normative ramifications, 
the treaty must ensure that sanctions 'hit where it hurts'. 
One of the documents given to me by informants was a draft for a pamphlet called "Stopping 
the Terror Trade; how human rights rules in an arms trade treaty can help deliver real security", and 
which used five symbolic examples, or cases, to show the consequences of not having such a treaty. 
Case one was a military attack on peaceful demonstrators in Conakry, saying among other things that 
armored vehicles drove into crowds, firing with live ammunition and tear gas; some of which were 
provided by private security companies with ties to the UK, the other cases being unsystematically 
similar.53 These graphically illustrated cases are examples of what Keck and Sikkink describe as 
symbolic politics, in that they draw upon testimonials and stories, present a juxtaposition of symbolic 
events and in that they are clearly meant  to  provoke reaction from audiences that are far away. 
Furthermore, they give an interpretation of this juxtaposition as all being related to the issue, i.e. the 
absence of an ATT (Keck & Sikkink 1998:22/201). Unlike in the examples of Keck and Sikkink, 
however, there were no particular events that were linked conceptually to an issue as a symbol, but  
rather multiple events on a smaller scale.   
4.2.3 – Leverage politics
As mentioned in 2.2.2, Bas Arts argues that while a non-state actor can have more influence on a 
certain policy than for example the USA, this does not entail that the non-state actor is the more 
53 A finished version of the pamphlet can be read at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/006/2009/
en/c84983b5-14ac-4eee-a389-d21979aa6d77/act300062009en.pdf 
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powerful actor;  he separates the notion of power from influence on the grounds that the former 
involves a degree of permanence, while the latter is episodic (1998:58). If non-state actors are to 
accomplish this influence on a certain policy,  they must induce other, more powerful actors to act on 
their behalf (or on the behalf of the issue). According to Keck and Sikkink, the way in which they do 
this is by linking issues to things that compel the more powerful to action, such as  economic interest, 
health or environmental concerns – i.e. material leverage – or in terms of shame or public image – 
moral leverage (1999:97). 
With regard to the latter, referred to by the informants as "shaming", inf#1 explains how they 
are one of the few NGOs doing empirical research that has in the past driven the Control Arms 
agenda in 'in terms of exposing specific arms transfers and saying, this is what is happening, these 
are the people involved, this is how the arms trade operated, this is it's mechanics, this is how it 
should be controlled'. According to him, the history of conventional arms control is basically the 
history of scandals, noting the UK as an example and that they sold arms to Iraq, also mentioning the 
US. Their strategy is exposure to the reality of the problem, he says, and it's these kinds of scandals  
that he thinks have led to an increased focus on border controls; this kind of exposure, he says, is 
more important than legal and policy research, although those too are necessary.54 
 It's their policy, inf#1 says, to name countries that have violated human rights, something that 
will be both a problem and a strength at the UN, where the environment is such that it is generally 
not accepted. Since Amnesty will often do this (though not so often in the case of the Control Arms 
campaign), there is always an environment of implied threat; governments will often 'rebut what they 
think we're going to say about them', he adds, citing an example with Myanmar. The skeptical states 
will  often come to rebut,  with the most  vocal  opponent  at  the moment always  being Egypt.  As 
mentioned in information politics, their emphasis on credibility is due in large part to what they refer 
to as "naming". An example of this can be found in their report on the People's Republic of China, 
entitled "Sustaining conflict  and human rights abuses – The flow of arms accelerates" (Amnesty 
International, 2006). This report argues that China, being one of the world's major arms exporters, 
has not entered any multilateral agreements which set human rights related criteria to the transfer of 
arms, and has in several cases sent military equipment to countries 'with a record of gross human 
rights violations'.55 In inf#1's opinion, however, actually exposing a country's transgressions is not as 
effective as the threat of exposure. In other words, the implied threat of "shaming" is more effective 
than actual "shaming" with regard to moral leverage. 
 Inf#2 also mentioned implied threat of bad publicity as one of their persuasion tactics vis-a-
vis nations, pointing out that they don't threaten directly – they simply use the media to voice their 
54 The reasons  they are  among the  only ones  doing this  kind  of  research,  which  incidentally  "saddens"  him,  is  that  it's  
specialized and resource intensive. He adds that they, of course, draw upon the global network of NGOs to facilitate this research. 
55 Available online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/030/2006/zh/be25c03a-d42b-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/asa170302006en.pdf 
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opinions.  Citing  the  examples  of  China  during  the  Olympics  and  the  December  '09  meeting  in 
Copenhagen, he says that it's a question of using opportunities. States 'don't want to be named and 
shamed' he says, and this has sometimes been used as a "powerful tool" and as an explicit strategy; 
usually, however, that's not the case, he says, and explains how it is more difficult with for example 
Egypt, because the only press they would fear 'would be Egyptian press, and considering that's state 
controlled, they've got it tied up in many respects'. In another example, the NGOs made it clear to the 
UK that if they allowed the consensus provision to go in in their dealings with the US, the NGOs 
'would not be happy with that', but that it went in anyway. 
The first is a fitting example of what Keck and Sikkink describes as the vulnerability of target 
actors being a key point in terms of moral leverage; stating for example that countries who aspire to 
belong to a normative community of nations are more susceptible to network pressure (1998:29). 
Inf#1 states that a lot of the governments that are skeptical to the ATT, are 'governments where there 
is no civil society or very limited civil society', or states where democratic considerations 'are not 
ones they have to worry about'. This means that the NGO influence is more limited. Getting states to 
influence other states, intelligently deploying strategic items and using well connected lobbyists will 
not work as well on some states, he says, but they will still try. 
Regarding their country-specific strategies, inf#1 says they have individual strategies for 'most of the 
big players'.  He cites  three  major  examples  of  such tactics,  the  first  being  about  states  existing 
obligations  and showing that  states  already have  obligations  under  their  national  laws  or  under 
international law, to demonstrate that they are not signing up to something new; this will work with 
some states, but sometimes it will fail on account of their existing obligations 'not being all that 
great'. Another way is to appeal to their strategic interest, with states starting to realize in some cases 
that 'a more responsible arms trade environment is going to address some of their security concerns  
as  well  as  some things  that  they  might  be  concerned  about,  like  human  rights  and  sustainable 
environment, sanctity of humanitarian law, you try to convince a state that an ATT is going to help 
stop  destabilizing  build-ups  in  their  region'.  Inf#1 uses  the  example  of  Russia,  that  'if  you  can 
convince them that it's going to help stop buildups in their region, that's something Russia is actually 
concerned about'. Additionally, he says, they will try to convince them that their arms industry will 
have market access to responsible arms traders within the regime, in which case 'they will listen more 
carefully to what you have to say'. 
In short, they appeal to strategic interest, economic interest and lastly, to public image; with 
some states, he says, it's a question 'of showing up their arguments to be cynically motivated'. In this 
case, if a state is vocal about being opposed to an ATT, the NGO members will show publicly what  
their  actual  trading behavior  is  and point  out  the  states  are  breaking arms  embargos,  trading to 
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massive human rights violators and 'getting rich of it'. This is what motivates their opposition, he 
says,  and  'not  some  kind  of  idealistic  thing  about  the  difficulties  of  small  states  implementing 
complex agreements – if you show that, instead, it's because they want to continue their irresponsible 
arms trading, then you can begin to isolate their influence'. These are all examples of what Keck and 
Sikkink describe as issue-linkage, though it runs slightly contrary to most examples; the issue is not 
necessarily being linked to something the state would perceive as negative, but is rather framed in 
terms of a potentially profitable outcome.  
Inf #2 points out that it's not always about influencing that government so much as getting 
governments to influence other governments; at the moment, he says, there 'is a move to try and 
influence  African  governments  to  put  pressure  on  China'  on  account  of  them  being  important 
commercial  clients  and  because  they  have  a  legitimacy  within  the  Chinese  government  that 
progressive European governments, and NGOs, lack. This is a common manner in which weaker 
actors  can  find  leverage  against  stronger  actors,  in  the  theory  of  Keck  &  Sikkink,  namely  in 
appealing to another strong actor to try and get it to influence the first one (1998:23).    
While inf#3 agrees that the implied threat of bad publicity is a part of their influence over  
states, she too maintains that it has it's limits. Having worked on terrorism for a number of years, she 
says, what struck her as amazing was how open governments were to NGOs, giving them access and 
relying on their expertice. There is a genuine respect for the role that NGOs play, she says, owing 
largely to the fact that the ATT was an NGO initiative to begin with. A consequence of this, she says, 
is  that  it's  not  just  about  'playing  bad  cop,  threatening  to  show  up  governments,  while  there's  
obviously an element of that, but I think having the support of the organizations is a big carrot for  
them  as  well'.  In  the  October  meeting,  inf#1  says,  they  booked  and  shared  venues  with  the 
government of Côte d'Ivoire, a circumstance he describes as lucky because it was a contrast to the 
'usual suspects',  namely 'the progressive European governments' which often helps the NGOs, he 
says, and because it sent a stronger message to have a country currently under UN arms embargo 
supporting the ATT with them. This was also beneficial to the image of Côte d'Ivoire, in the sense of 
useful association, so the benefit was mutual.56 In lending states support and supplying them with 
information,  the  network  actors  increase  their  political  influence;  furthermore,  this  seems  to  be 
somewhat at odds with actively using moral leverage and accountability politics. 
As we shall see, their internal documents support this interpretation, especially with regard to their 
emphasis on using supportive states as instruments in furthering their policy goals. Identifying points 
of leverage, says Keck and Sikkink, is 'a crucial strategic step in network campaigns', along with 
56 In talking about the practicalities of finding a venue, inf#3 says that 'NGOs sometimes go around and speak to governments  
at their desk, just crouching down by their desk'. She adds that it's 'all about optics', explaining that it's sometimes very useful for a  
government to be percieved in deep consultation with a certain NGO, while other times it's 'really not, and they don't want to meet out  
in broad daylight as it were'. 
49
'securing powerful allies', e.g.,  getting a group of states to pressure a state over which they as a  
network  have  no  direct  influence  (1999:97).  In  an  internal,  six-page  CAC  document  entitled 
"DRAFT PROJECT PLAN – UN First Committee 2009", which is distributed to lobbyists a few 
weeks before the meeting, they are given instructions on 1) their aim for that meeting, 2) internal  
objectives, 3) the text of the resolution, 4) key lobby targets, 5) key messages and 6) methods for 
achieving all of the above. 
The network had obtained a confidential draft of the resolution that was to be announced at 
the  first  committee,  which  set  out  to  reframe  the  OEWG  meetings  of  2010  into  preparatory 
committees or "prepcoms", and could therefore make changes in their approach accordingly. Their 
goals  and  worries  are  neatly  summed  up  in  bolded  text  saying  that  a  'weak  ATT would  be 
worthless'. The "draft project plan" gives some specific notes on how lobbyists are to approach their 
government  representatives/Foreign  Ministers  in  capitals,  which  warns  the  lobbyists  that  'they 
[gov.rep.] may not have seen the resolution at this points, so need to tread carefully and lead with 
what must be in the resolution, NOT our analysis with what's wrong with current draft'. This suggests 
that  the  network  has  good  access  to  information,  something  that  would  be  indispensable  in 
identifying points of leverage and preparing a strategy to use them. 
Essentially, their project plan details their strategy of 'lobbying prior to 1st Cttee in key states 
in order to influence the resolution and substantive debates', as well as lists the key states who author 
the resolution (UK, France and USA), the supportive states that they deem the most influential (16 
states including Norway and Côte d'Ivoire). Their stated strategy is to use the latter states to pressure 
the former to change the text of the resolution, mostly focusing on the UK. Judging from the text, 
their strategies are very much focused on the countries which to some extent already support the 
ATT, and, writing about the skeptics and opponents, they say the following: "There is a risk that 
some in this group will move from abstain to no. We will continue to lobby as much as we can, but  
recognising that our influence is fairly limited". 
As  for  the  specific  methods  they  outline,  one  of  them is  to  facilitate  a  small  group  of 
"progressive  states"  that  are  prepared  to  'stand  up  to  disappointing  resolution  and  take  joint 
leadership role with other states in calling for robust language'. Furthermore, it says they are pursuing 
the idea with a number of states (Mexico, Norway, Ghana, NZ) but that 'none seem keen to "stick 
necks out" if  would involve criticising the UK [sic]'.  Several ambassadors are listed as potential 
contacts, and they are instructed to get government representatives from supportive states to voice 
their opinions 'out strongly in plenary'.57 Under the heading "Lobbying strategy", they outline a few 
concrete goals in terms of key targets, the first being that the US, previously a key blocker of the 
57 In terms of execution, the document ends with a recommendation on getting these things across the first two weeks, before  
the resolution draft  is widely circulated to states – previous experience having indicated that their influence is limited once it  is  
circulated – and that the third and fourth week be used to 'get in the vote'. This is in accordance with the phases sketched out in their  
action circular, which is discussed below in 4.2.4. 
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process, does not stall progress toward negotiations. Secondly, it says that they must 'also prioritise 
targeting key supportive or progressive States' [their formatting], in order to get them to attend the 
meetings,  hold  bilateral  meetings  with  other  such  states  to  encourage  partnership,  build  on  the 
OEWG contributions and be ready to oppose a weak wording of the treaty.
In the present case, the transnational advocacy network seems to have employed the various 
methods Keck and Sikkink describe as forms of leverage politics, though not in a manner completely 
analogous to their use of the term. According to informants, while they exert moral leverage in the 
form of "shaming", they tend to downplay it for the reasons that is 1) poorly received in the UN, 2) 
less effective than implied threats and 3) in that they prefer to appeal to mutual benefit vis-a-vis 
states (for example in that states look to them for help and image-related positive association, and 
they are given access and influence). They also acknowledge the limits to leverage politics as pointed 
out by Keck and Sikkink, namely that leverage is dependant on the vulnerability of targets (i.e. on 
whether these states aspire to belong to a community)(1998:29). In their strategies toward key targets 
they employ issue-linkage to 1) a state's obligations – not in the sense of accountability politics, but 
in showing that they are not proposing something new – 2) strategic interests and 3) public image; 
which can be shaming, but with the added intention of limiting the shamed actors influence with 
other states, thereby isolating it's influence. Their preferred strategy of exerting leverage seems to be 
reshaping the alliances among actors; the primary way in which they approach this is to get groups of 
supportive states to influence more powerful actors. 
4.2.4 – Anomalous data on political influence
4.2.4.1   -  Synchronized UN/Capital lobbying
A significant portion of the data collected on their  methods and the manner  in which they seek 
political influence at the UN are not easily analysed in the typology of Keck and Sikkink. The most 
significant of these – in the sense that informants talked extensively about it – was the dual focus on 
UN diplomats and capitals from and in 'larger and more complicated governments' (inf#1).58 While it 
could arguably be understood as a mix between leverage and information politics, it does not fit the 
explanation of these types as sketched out by Keck and Sikkink. 
When asked what kind of strategy they have for making causes relevant in the UN and what  
specific methods they use to get attention, inf#1 replied that direct lobbying in capitals is the most 
important strategy in the UN. According to him, whenever they are trying to influence the larger and 
more  complicated  governments,  and  in  some  cases  also  with  smaller  governments,  there's  'a 
58  It should be noted that it is hard for me, based on the recorded audio, to make out if they are saying capital or capitol, i.e. the  
distinction between houses of legislature and the capital city. In their correspondence, they use both interchangeably and inconsistently.  
This distinction does not alter the argument, but readers should be aware that  quotations might be inaccurate. 
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perception  that you can just turn up at the UN and influence delegations; it's the easiest thing in the 
world for a delegation to say, well, we're just waiting for instructions from the capital, but a lot of the 
times that's actually true, and unless you lay the groundwork in capitals, then you're influence is 
going to be very negligible once you get to the UN'. So they set up the structure of the campaign with 
a priority on reaching as many influential capitals as possible, he says, and this will start long before 
the first day of the meeting; the network of MSP (military, security, policing) coordinators in each AI 
section will set up meetings with government officials to disseminate reports and present the content 
of the action circulate, which is essentially an advocacy strategy document. This lobbying in capitals, 
he says, will be backed up by campaigning actions, media stunts, reports, press releases, internal 
briefing documents and so forth. 
There's a continuous debate within the organization,  according to inf#1, about how much 
funding to spend on popular mobilization and getting 'a massive load of people to the UN' and how 
much to spend on direct lobbying toward capitals. In his perception, in-capital lobbying is much 
more important than a big UN presence, mostly because government representatives that they are 
trying to influence in the UN will be receiving constant instructions from their capitals, even during 
the course of a particular meeting. Since this is how governments work, he says, the organizations 
must adapt and work simultaneously in both places. In a sense they duplicate the manner in which 
states  work  toward  the  UN,  making  sure  that  their  political  influence  is  more  or  less  equally 
distributed in both the domestic and the international arenas. 
Inf#2 said the same things as inf#1 in terms of there being a priority on the relationship of 
governmental representatives in the UN and lobbying work in capitals/capitols. He explains that even 
though  decisions  most  often  come  from  the  capitols,  it's  generally  better  if  the  government 
representatives at the UN understand the issues. Additionally, there's an advantage to having IANSA 
members talk to government representatives, an opportunity they often will not get  elsewhere, he 
says, and which will give them experience and help them build up relationships and possibly the 
opportunity to talk to them back in their countries – he refers to this as long term capacity building, 
noting that there is a circularity involved. Inf#3 also pointed to the prophylactics of sending people 
into the capitals with the action circulate in advance of confrontations in the UN, as a top priority. It's 
the diplomats who say they need to check with capital and that they don't know what their country is 
doing, she says, who are perhaps the most common problem. She adds that this is more of a tactic for 
some organizations  than  for  others,  stating  that  for  Amnesty,  who has  a  large  network  with  40 
sections being active on the ATT and in regular meetings with their governments, this is an effective 
strategy. 
From the  point  of  view of  the  lobbyists  at  the  UN,  they tend  to  use  their  member-base 
strategically in reaching out to diplomats. According to inf#3, they coordinate it so that there are 
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different  regional  groups of  lobbyists,  from different  organizations,  who target  diplomats  within 
different world regions. This, she says, is to make sure that 'we're getting kind of a good spread, we 
identify  key target  countries  to  put  more  pressure  on,  having  deviced  material  beforehand,  and 
arguments  that  we can use for particular  governments  to  try and persuade them to change their 
policy'. In the case of key countries, she says, they have government specific strategies, adding that 
this is usually handled by organizational representatives from the sections within that country, since 
they  will  ideally  have  developed  a  direct  relationship.  Inf#2's  description  of  how they work  to 
prepare the bigger meetings in the UN matches this description. He notes that IANSA is a big global 
network, with nine hundred members around the world, so in most cases they will have members in 
especially relevant  nations  -  he  cites  Kenya as  an example -  working on the  ATT and who are 
indispensable at the UN meetings.  If Kenya is a top priority country, they will look at their members 
in  Kenya and see who works for the ATT, get  them to the meeting to  talk to  their  government 
representatives at the UN. 
Their internal action documents support these explanations, and show that this is a heavily 
prioritized strategy. In a document (e-mail) entitled "Action Request on the ATT ahead of the UNGA 
First Committee and materials for MSP coordinators", military,  security and policing lobbyists at 
regional AI offices in the capitals of target countries are given instructions on the finer points of what 
they are expected to approach the 'relevant officials in  [their] Ministries of Foreign Affairs' about, as 
well as template letters and information on that country's specific role in the ATT, or in the types of 
transgressions covered by an ATT. Furthermore, the document requests that once these meetings have 
taken place, the MSP staff present in the UN are to receive feedback on the outcome of the meeting 
so that it can be incorporated into their strategy. This and related documents all contain an attachment 
updating them on the current draft of the resolution, it's flaws from the network's perspective, and 
what changes they are currently lobbying towards, as well as a short paraphrase of the main goals of 
the ATT.  
From the dates, it is apparent that these e-mails, starting about two months before the UN 
meeting, culminate in what they call an "action circular" the last week before the event, which is 
essentially their final instructions regarding UN/capital lobbying and what they want to achieve.59 
This action circulate originates from the Amnesty Int. Secretariat, and is sent out to all AI sections, 
MSP coordinators, campaign coordinators, press officers, staff/volunteers, as well as the ATT SC 
members and the CAC staff, covering most if not all of the network. Starting with a background, it 
details the general aim and objectives, the advocacy action plan, key messages, lobbying strategy, 
states official positions, recommended actions, public awareness strategy, policy reference material, 
59 The document described as the action circular is entitled: "An effective Arms Trade Treaty: "The World Can't Wait": Achieveing a 
strong resolution for negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty at the 64th UN General Assembly, 2009 (ACT 30/0072009)". The 
document is internal (http://intranet.amnesty.org/cp/).  
53
coordination of events and, lastly,  templates to letters that are  to be sent  to ministers of foreign 
affairs. 
The action circular divides lobbying in home capitals into three phases, the first being before 
the first committee; here they are instructed to influence the draft resolution and state's statements. 
This phase contains speculation on how the UK will work on the draft, in terms of who they will  
meet with in bilateral and multilateral meetings. It is vital, it says, that 'as many AI sections and their  
NGO partners as possible lobby key officials in their home capitals as soon as possible  and keep 
pressure on their governments to ensure that all UN delegations receive good instructions from their 
capitals in sufficient time to engage in the discussions on the draft resolution [...]'. The next phase 
covers the first weeks of the FC, and deals with 'locking down the draft resolution language'. Here 
they are asked to stay prepared for last  minute changes  that  obstruct their  vision of an ATT (in 
retrospect, the US-introduced consensus provision was precisely such a change). Phase 3 deals with 
week 3-4  and  is  concerned  with  gathering  votes  (there  is  little  specified  in  the  text  under  this 
heading). This phasing of the process seems to combine the agenda formation and negotiation stages 
of Young (1998:21) with stages 2-4 in Keck and Sikkink (1999:98)(table 2.1); while the network 
follows the states in terms of how these work, their focus is different. They seem to draw upon all the  
different strategies simultaneously in any given stage, differentiating only in terms of specific goals. 
Under recommended actions, the action circular urges lobbyists to use the tools provided to 
make  a  strong case  with  the  relevant  governments  officials,  and to  include  'relevant  illustrative 
examples of the need for an ATT that will require effective risk assessment and control mechanisms 
at the national level' to prevent violations against international human rights law and humanitarian 
law,  etc.  They are  then  pointed  to  examples  that  are  especially suitable  in  the  relevant  regions. 
Additionally,  they are  asked to  make sure that  the government  official  sends instructions  to  the 
mission  at  the  UN  regarding  the  points  on  which  they  came  to  an  agreement,  and  that  their 
representatives in the UN are instructed to attend ATT meetings (whether official or CAC related). 
The lobbyists are also instructed to encourage government officials to make explicit reference to 
CAC related material in their statements to the UNGA, suggesting that the network is also using this 
as an opportunity to self-promote.  
In this section a strategy was described in which the network takes a synchronized approach 
toward UN and capital lobbying, an approach that does not fit with the explanation of types seen in 
Keck and Sikkink. The network essentially mimic states: Since diplomats at the UN receive orders 
from capitals, the network ensures that their influence has an equal presence there; additionally, they 
track the various stages of states' work on a draft resolution to keep up with last minute changes and 
lobby for their ideal version. This work in capitals is not limited to lobbying, but is supported by 
campaigning as well, and both aspects require a large network with substantial resources. A benefit of 
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their approach, is that lobbyists working in the UN build contacts with government representatives 
from countries, which in turn enable them to partake in capital lobbying later on. Additionally, the 
NGOs deploy their members strategically, based on regions, so that NGO representatives from target 
countries are used in talking to that country's diplomats at the UN. The importance of this strategy is 
confirmed by textual sources, which also suggest that lobbyists in capitals are equipped with precise, 
country-specific information, are tasked with updating the NGO personnel at the UN on the states' 
position and are simultaneously self-promoting the CAC text. 
4.2.4.2   -  System of incentives, reshaping alliances
Another important strategy for them which is not easily reconciled with the typological categories of 
Keck and Sikkink,  is  to continuously frame the agenda or issue in  such a  way as  to appeal  to 
governments  interests  and creating  a system of  incentives.  This  is  a  form of  multivariate  issue-
linkage that is not covered by the examples Keck and Sikkink use in their explanation of material 
leverage, which – if one is to go by their examples – is primarily explained as a singular relation of  
material leverage, i.e. in facilitating a link between an issue and something a target actor is concerned 
with (such as a threat to their strategic or financial interests). Essentially, one of their strategies in the 
case of the ATT is to convince states that it would be in their advantage to not be left outside the fold, 
and in doing this they must create an image of the ATT as representing something that is beneficial as 
opposed to restrictive. This hinges on their ability to get powerful actors onboard, which relates back 
to leverage politics in that their primary way of doing this is to induce sympathetic governments to 
act on their behalf. Informants #1 and #2 mention it as a top priority, although it's something that is  
challenging for the network to control. 
Inf#1  explains  how  it  is  very  difficult  to  pinpoint  states  views,  as  there's  often  a  large 
discrepancy between their states opinions and their real opinions, and their positions will often have 
to be deduced from hints in spoken interventions at the debates. Sometimes Egypt adopts the US 
arguments in their statements, that they just don't want a treaty that is too weak and will therefore  
undermine the possibility of adequate arms controls, which – according to inf#1 – is not really what 
they  think.  Other  times  they  will  talk  about  the  difficulty  of  more  states  implementing  such  a 
complex agreement, and, he says, they will also talk about the necessity of having a level playing 
field. Many NGO lobbyists, he adds, are starting to think that the negotiations will change the center 
of influence from the General Assembly to the veto-countries [P5], even though it will remain a 
General Assembly process.  Everyone is looking to them already, he says, since they are the world's 
largest arms traders as well; if they manage to get these nations aboard, it would create an 'internal 
marked bound by a set of rules which are the ATT'. This will enable the NGOs, he says, to convince 
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skeptical  countries  that  dealing  outside  of  that  marked  regime  will  be  entail  a  commercial  and 
strategic disadvantage. This is why it's important to get the US onboard, in as much as they will 
facilitate such a regime and Britain, France, Russia, China and other states will perhaps follow on 
account of the these incentives.60 
In order to build the incentives they are talking about, reducing the incentive of operating 
outside the regime and increasing the commercial and strategic incentives of operating within the 
regime, inf #1 and #3 both point out how it has to be a legally binding and universal treaty. Inf#1 
refers to what he calls the geometrics of this kind of treaty, saying that since it's a regulatory and not 
a ban treaty – like the one for cluster munitions and landmines – you are seeking 'not to prohibit an 
activity, but to regulate it, so the incentives for operating outside of it are much greater'. Another 
difference, he says, is that you are talking about a significantly more comprehensive set of activities 
than were ever involved in the the other treaties.  The global arms trade,  he says,  is  a huge and 
internationally strategic 'thing in a way that the cluster munitions or landmines are not', explaining 
that  while  these  are  tactically  important  for  militiaries,  they  are  not  on  the  level  of  state's  
international strategic interests to the same extent. 
Since there are currently financial incentives to operate outside an ATT, the universality of it's 
coverage is much more important. This is why, inf#1 says, they have to get as many states as possible 
on board, and since it represents a threat or gain to a number of interests, economically, strategically,  
militarily, 'and because you are talking about a regulatory treaty in stead of a ban treaty, it's going to 
be a much much more complex process with a lot more dimensions'. Whereas the cluster munitions 
and landmines treaties  are  only controlling one thing,  essentially,  this  treaty will  have to  define 
'everything that's involved, define all the kinds of transfers that might be controlled and how, to 
define a set of criteria along which those might be controlled, to define the mechanics of how they 
are applied, to define implementation and cooperation assistance, to implement that, that's of the 
order of complexity of an international trade agreement, and we all know how complex those are'. 
This is why, he says, the challenge is much greater. 
This form of issue linkage is multivariate, on the one hand, and speculative, on the other; 
regarding the first, because it targets many countries in a number of different ways, and regarding the 
second, because the outcome is uncertain and hard to directly influence. As discussed above with 
leverage politics, their focus is to reshape the alliances among actors by getting groups of supportive 
states to influence more powerful actors. And as with leverage politics, this case seems to suggest 
that  the  network  benefit  more from positive  appeals  to  states'  interests  rather  than  shaming and 
similar tactics.  The goal  is  to frame the ATT as an internal  marked bound by the treaty's  rules,  
allowing the  network  to  make the  argument  that  countries  left  outside  the  fold  will  suffer.  The 
60 The question remains, he adds, what Russia and China really think about the ATT – this will determine whether or not they 
will see such an effect. 
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challenge then is to maintain the principles that they want to see in the phrasing of the resolution, 
given the complexity of the phenomenon it encompasses and the financial threat it represents to the 
p5 countries (who are simultaneously the biggest arms exporters and the most influential actors).  
4.2.4.3     -     The US-introduced consensus provision; an example
An example of both the synchronized capital/UN lobbying, the "system of incentives" approach and 
the way in which they attempt to reshape alliances among states, can be found in the network's 
response to the US introducing a consensus provision to the treaty. Informants agree that the biggest 
challenge they had at the First Committee in October '09, was the issue of the US signing on to the  
ATT with the consensus provision. Both the meaning, content and consequences of this consensus 
provision,  says  inf#1,  were the subject  of a heated debate among governments  and NGOs.  This 
development gave rise to concern, primarily because historically, he says, consensus provisions tend 
to 'kills progressive treaties', since any country can then stall and weaken the formulation of the final 
treaty. This echoes what Bas Arts said about the consequences of the international community being 
anarchic; that common initiatives will often be weak compromises and that veto-based resolutions 
often result in a situation where those who want less, have the biggest impact on policy (1998:21, as 
discussed in 2.2.1). 
This concern was balanced by the need to get more powerful actors onboard with the treaty.  
Having the US onboard, explains inf#1, would be 'such a big prize, strategically'. Consequently, there 
was a lot of heated discussion, he says, internally in the NGOs and in governments, about whether to 
accept this or try to change it at the expense of the US. This became a problem of framing the issue 
correctly, in so far as 'if you're really going to go hard on this and say, this is totally unacceptable, we 
are going to denounce the process if this consensus provision goes in, how do you communicate that 
to both the governments and the public'.  Inf#1 explains how this  would be 'a hard sell',  i.e.  not 
accepting the process because of how the meetings would be run in two year's time, which would 
presumably seem trivial and  petulant to outsiders. Furthermore, it could prove to be a minor problem 
in  the  end,  since  formal  aspects  such  as  the  consensus  provision  could  still  be  changed  in  the 
subsequent years; it would not necessarily be the end game, he says, if the provision went in now. A 
certain  problem,  however,  was  that  skeptical  states  would  then  be  focused  on  protecting  that 
provision. In the end, the meeting was characterized by strategic arguments around negotiation rather 
than the actual ATT, and government landed on whichever sides of the debate, he says, even within 
the EU block, which is rare.
Inf#2 also brings up the US vote as a major point of contention at the last meeting. In his  
mind, it is very useful to have them onboard as they are 'huge arms exporters, therefore they have a 
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lot  of  influence'.  He  explains  their  provision  as  demanding  consensus  was  included  into  the 
negotiating treaty, meaning the meeting when the final text is settled. The meaning of consensus here 
is a bit unclear, he explains, because in the UN it does not entail that everyone agress so much as that 
there is no disagreement.61 According to inf#3, the Control Arms campaign at the time interpreted 
this provision to mean that any state  would be given a veto on the formulation of the ATT, which 
would lead to the lowest common denominator being the general tone of the treaty, which would then 
be very weak; or worse, that the countries will simply remove from the treaty the aspects that are not 
in their interest. She adds that this was just their interpretation, and that the meaning was and remains 
unclear as to what the provision in fact will entail. 
Although they did not explain in detail how they dealt with this challenge, their methods are 
apparent from documents pertaining to the consensus provision. In the internal correspondence from 
October 2009, the challenge of the US consensus provision is discussed at length. An e-mail entitled 
"MSP Coordinators;  update  from UNGA First  Ctte  –  resolution  developments,  "consensus"  and 
upcoming rapid action", dated mid-october and sent to the same recipients as the action circular, 
describes the in-capital lobbying as hugely successful, mostly because the UK changed the resolution 
on account of supportive states speaking vocally about necessary changes in plenary, as per lobbying 
instructions.   In  this  document,  the  provision  is  described  as  a  threat  which  might  'derail  or 
significantly  stall  the  process,  forcing  supportive  States  to  take  the  process  outside  the  UN'. 
Discussions  between  US  Secretary  of  State  Hillary  Clinton  and  UK  Foreign  Secretary  David 
Miliband led the network to believe that the UK would be forced to capitulate on the matter, and that 
if they did not, the US would work to 'effectively wreck the process'. Most supportive states were 
talked into it, the document says, barring the EU countries who were largely vocal against it (possible 
exception in France, who they say is 'in a potential difficult position as part of the Permanent 5'). 
Writing about the UK, they say that they 'have since welcomed in public the USA's policy shift on 
the ATT, albeit privately reckognising that they have had to compromise on the issue of consensus 
[...]'. 
Attached to this letter are instructions to restart capital lobbying in what they refer to as a 
"rapid response request", wherein all the lobbyists are given 'detailed recommendations on language 
and tactics'  that  they can 'wield  with  governments  when discussing  the  issue'.  Essentially,  these 
arguments are technical and historical, demonstrating that the consensus provision has no precedence 
and that it is not the common way of handling such negotiations, invoking a distinction between "the 
broadest  possible  agreement"  and  "absolute  consensus",  and  that  going  along  with  this  would 
threaten any future progressive treaties in the UNGA. It also invokes previous statements on other 
matters by states which essentially warn of the same danger. A follow up to this document was sent 
61 He did not explain what he thought this indicated. 
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out  the  next  week,  22/10/2009,  containing  details  of  specific  action  requests  for  target  states, 
meaning those who 'may be persuaded to abstain on operative paragraph 5 and record their reasons 
for doing so (paragraph 5 being the consensus provision), as well as a transcription on the states' 
opinion of the paragraph, as gouged since the document of the week before. Additionally, there was a 
model letter enclosed that lobbyists could send or present to government officials, specifically noting 
that it was not to be sent to skeptic states, the co-authors of the resolution draft or to the countries 
with whom the network lobbyists were still in active discussion in New York.    
In the following week, on the 29th of October '09, another update was sent out, stating that a 
number of states had come together for a series of informal meetings, naming themselves "Friends of 
a  Better  OP5"  (Germany,  Norway,  Netherlands,  Mexico,  Ireland,  Austria,  Liechtenstein,  New 
Zealand), discussing how they could alter  the consensus provision.  After 'a variety of twists and 
turns', the documents says, 'German diplomats in Washington had a meeting with US government 
officials [...] in an attempt to broker some amended language for OP5 without losing US support'.  
The document then mentions confidential sources as affirming that the paragraph was changed to a 
more abstract formulation, effectively not tying the consensus to decision-making any more, but that 
no one was sure what this meant, i.e. if it was a success or a worsening of the situation. 
As mentioned in 2.2.3, Young claims that the aim of negotiations are generally not, as in  
legislative  settings,  to  put  together  winning  coalitions,  but  rather  building  consensus  (1998:13). 
Writing further on this, he claims that the 'preferred coalition among those negotiating the terms of a 
constitutive contract is the coalition of the whole', and that the 'political dynamic arising from this 
feature of institutional bargaining is one that centers on consensus building and therefore on the 
crafting of constitutive contracts that are agreeable to all but not lacking in substance' (1998:13-14). 
As we have seen, this issue is more complicated in the case of the ATT, and while the positions of 
states on this matter remain unclear, it seems that the hypotheses of regime theory are not directly 
applicable to the position of transnational advocacy networks in this case. A possible reason for this 
is  a  focus  on  the  underlying  issues  of  the  case  as  opposed  to  it's  relation  to  national  interest. 
Interestingly, this is how Young describes countries: As focusing more on causes than being rational 
utility  maximizers  (1998:2)(compare  2.2.3).  He  further  writes  that  pressure  groups  can  cause 
countries  who  are  unclear  on  their  position  to  act  in  an  inconsistent  manner,  thereby  exerting 
influence and becoming actors which in turn might lead to provisions that governments would not 
introduce. This seems to be in part confirmed by the networks relationship with the UK, as described 
above.
The challenge of the consensus provision gives an example of how the network operates, in as 
much as it raised problems pertaining to the framing of the issue (having the US onboard was a  
strategic "prize", but not at any cost, and denouncing the process on account of a single provision 
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would be hard to justify).  Their internal correspondence on this matter shows that synchronized 
UN/capital lobbying was used to meet this challenge, specifically in order to influence the phrasing 
of the resolution, and that the network constantly updates their lobbying instructions based on their 
access to information. The focus of their lobbying seems to be to reshape alliances among actors, in 
order to get supportive states to lobby more powerful actors on their behalf, and to reframe the issue 
in such a way as to increase the incentives of coming onboard with the ATT.  
4.2.5 – Informants' perceptions on priorities, effectiveness and influence
When asked which actors and methods were the most effective at the UN, the answers varied a bit 
(and  they  were  not  entirely  consistent  with  previous  statements).  Inf#1  distinguished  between 
national NGOs and international NGOs, saying that 'certainly IANSA, Amnesty,  Oxfam to some 
extent, have, or constitute a global network, and then that network is massively enriched by all the 
other national NGOs' who they draw upon for specific assistance. To his mind, it is a question more 
of coordination and agility rather than influence; national NGOs or, correspondingly, NGOs without 
a membership, he says, can often make decisions much faster than global NGOs can, since the latter 
are  bound by a  democratic  structure to  consult  with  their  membership,  or  to  be bound by their 
policies that are agreed upon democratically. As a global network, he feels that they bring with them 
more influence to a lobbying situation in the UN, and that governments and NGOs both feel that the 
INGOs move too slowly on their own and therefore benefit from national NGOs. The INGOs will  
have sections in their member countries, and play a different role to the national NGOs in that they 
address the international setting with the weight of a global membership behind them. This, he feels, 
allows their arguments and evidence to 'influence a while range of governments'.62 . 
About the effectivity of methods, he – like the other informants - says that any campaign has 
to mobilize the full spectrum of tactics available. They simply need to tread a balance between and 
combine, he says,  visibility and legitimacy.63 With something 'as big as this, as multi-dimensional as 
this, were what you're talking about are the fundamental interests, strategic interests of all the states, I 
think you have to  have a  popular  movement behind it'.  The legitimacy,  then,  is  tied to  genuine 
mobilization of people. Well connected lobbyists, he says, are something they have on top of that,  
along with well timed and informed reports, good sets of arguments deployed at 'precisely the right 
62Adding to this, he says that some NGOs are particularly influential in some countries, and that national NGOs – provided their  
country of origin are one of the powerful or bigger countries – can carry significant weight in the international setting.  The UK 
government, being one of these governments, has been very influential in the ATT setting, he says, 'stewarding the process through the 
United Nations'. While national NGOs  or NGOs that are particularly influential in the UK might have had an influence on how the  
process runs or what the treaty will contain, he insists that, on the other hand, 'it  it's an international environment where every state has  
their own vote, so I think there's also something about how we play slightly different roles'. 
63 He explains that while some NGOs have visibility but are lacking in legitimacy,  meaning that while they have influence with  
governments and visibility in the press and in the UN, they do not have geniunely popular movements behind them. This will often  
succeed, but can also 'come back to haunt them'. In this setting, legitimacy is understood in a democratic sense. 
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time  with  precisely  the  right  diplomats'.  But  these  are  not  as  convincing  without  the  popular 
mobilization. You might succeed with only one of these in campaigns that don't touch upon the core 
strategic or economic interests of states, he says, but not in the case of the ATT. 
Inf#2 puts importance on having a large, multi-cultural presence in the UN, as it gives the 
impression that it's a global campaign, stating that diplomats react to seeing different faces, races and 
colors.  The huge network of IANSA, he says,  is  a key part  in facilitating the lobbying and the 
presence in meetings. The statements of inf#1 and #2 match the conclusions from Keck and Sikkink 
regarding actor characteristics as a prerequisite for the success of a campaign, specifically regarding 
network  density,  described  as  having  strongly  connected  members  with  reliable  information, 
representation and institutional leverage.64 
Inf#2 adds that the political influence of the NGOs in the UN is hard to gauge, but that it is 
significant. The only way to budge a state that's 'really dug in', he says, is to get huge public support, 
but most states are not 'dug in'. Most states, he says, will react to their agenda (the ATT) as a good 
thing, he says, they 'just need to know why they think it's a good thing'. The key role of the NGO 
then, is to provide researched and easily accessible information. While not many states would say 
that the killing of innocent people and the destroying of their homes is a good thing, he explains, they 
might still reply that they already have regional agreements to deal with that sort of thing; these are 
the people who need further convincing, and they 'are in a position to do that'. He also claims that the 
influence is undeniable in that there wouldn't be an ATT initiative as we know it without the NGOs, 
who have been involved with it from the start, adding that states will refer back to IANSA, AI and 
Oxfam in their statements, which is "telling" of the influence they have. 
According to inf#3, the effectiveness of methods should be understood the other way around, 
where  popular  mobilization,  media  and  activism  in  the  media,  while  indispensable,  is  not  as 
influential as direct lobbying in the UN. To her mind, the direct lobbying is what counts at the end of  
the day. She also felt that there wouldn't have been an ATT without the NGO involvement, adding 
that  their  influence is  different  in the different  phases of  the process,  but  that  it  was  absolutely 
indispensable at the beginning. In steering it in the right direction, she says, the direct lobbying is  
crucial; in this phase of the process, however, they might still fail in getting their message through. 
64 Compare with 2.2.4, or Keck and Sikkink (1998:26)
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion
In the following, the main points of evidence will be summarized in relation to the problem statement 
and research questions (5.1) and the theoretical suppositions (5.2). Findings will be reviewed in terms 
of reliability and validity, as well as relevance to the field and future studies (5.3). 
5.1 - Remarks on design and structure
The topic of this study has been the analysis of the different ways transnational advocacy networks 
seek political influence, defined as the achievement of specific policy goals, in the United Nations. 
This is a contribution to the overarching debate in theory on International Society of whether non-
state actors should be considered players alongside states.65 In order for this question to be answered, 
it must be preceded by an understanding of how, and the conditions under which, civil actors operate. 
This study is focused on how non-state actors perceive themselves as influencing the international 
arena, and not how they are perceived by others. As such, it does not seek to penetrate what Bas Arts 
refers  to  as  the disproportionate  ego-perception of  NGOs,  meaning their  tendency to  sometimes 
overestimate and misrepresent their own political capacity and influence (1998:301).   
In chapter two, the theoretical concepts of the study were delineated, centering on the arena in 
which the transnational advocacy network operated in this case, the concept of political influence and 
regimes, using elements from regime theory and a multiple case study by Bas Arts (1998), and the 
general  characteristics  of  transnational  advocacy  networks  as  described  by  Keck  and  Sikkink 
(1998/1999). The latter's description of a typology of how networks seek political  influence was 
applied  as  the  operational  concept  and   primary  tool  of  analysis.  Chapter  three  showed  the 
methodological choices  of this study, including problems related to field-work, the use of sources, 
validity, reliability and bias. The method used in this study is a qualitative, iterative approach, with 
the object of matching the data with patterns from theory to see if it fits, or if the data can tell us  
something new.  
Chapter  four  presented  the  gathered  data  and analyzed it  in  terms  of  the  theoretical  and 
operational concepts discussed in chapter two, thereby showing how the CAC network operates, their 
access to the arena in question and the challenges they face. In analyzing their strategy and methods 
for achieving political influence, the emphasis was on the typology presented by Keck and Sikkink.  
The  object  of  this  chapter  is  to  highlight  the  results  of  this  pattern-matching,  both  in  terms  of 
congruent and anomalous data, and discuss them with regard to theoretical implications, external 
validity, reliability and relevance to the field. 
65 Keck and Sikkink, (1998:210). 
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5.2  -  The political influence of transnational advocacy networks
5.2.1 - Concepts and definitions
The theoretical definitions of central concepts as presented in 2.2 of the theory chapter, seem to be 
largely congruent with the data gathered in this case; consequently, redefining these concepts is not 
part of the goal in this study. The applied definitions of arena, political influence, regimes and the 
characteristics of transnational advocacy networks, as well as their related suppositions, all seem to 
be applicable to the findings.66 Divergence from theory occurred primarily in relation to the typology 
of political influence, in terms of the manner in which they seek political influence, as well as in the 
hypotheses relating to the prerequisites for a campaign to be successful.        
Regarding  Bas  Arts'  concept  of  an  arena  (1998:55),  informants  confirmed  his  statements 
regarding their semi-formal status at the UN; they are permitted to make statements, can observe 
meetings and occasionally make formal interventions in the debate. Their access to this arena is still 
significantly less than states', whom they must influence to realize policy goals on their behalf rather 
than directly. In addition to the formal rules, informants mention informal rules (an example being 
the practice of shaming and naming transgressions by individual countries, which is poorly received). 
Though  there  are  numerous  challenges  involved,  the  CAC network  still  has  an  opportunity  to 
promote their cause and to be heard. The definition of political influence supplied by Bas Arts is 
sufficiently general to cover it's use by informants, who, incidentally, also refer to counterfactual 
reasoning in the explanation of political influence, albeit in different words – i.e., they claim that if 
they had not been involved, there would not have been an ATT.67 
Regarding treaties and regimes, my research matches the considerations of Young regarding 
the distinctions between hard law and soft law, the threat of resolutions becoming "dead letters" and 
informal elements being of equal importance to official positions; based on the account given by 
informants, the creation of regimes seems to be an open-ended and multidimensional process both 
from the point of view of NGOs and states. Regarding the stages of regime formation, they seem to 
be less relevant when applied to transnational advocacy networks. The agenda formation phase is 
continuous through negotiations, for example, and as outsiders the networks are not limited by the 
formal stages of the process in the same way as states are. From the point of view of transnational  
advocacy networks, the stages of regime formation are repeated every time there is a challenge to the 
current framing of the debate – because of this, the macro-perspective employed by Young (1998) 
seems unsuitable. In this regard it must be noted that the findings of this study are limited by the 
short time-line, which may contribute significantly to this issue. 
66 Bas Arts (1998:55/301), Young (1998:4) and Keck and Sikkink (1999:89), respectively.  
67 Informants #2 and #3, specifically. 
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Keck  and  Sikkinks  account  of  the  characteristics  of  transnational  advocacy  networks  is 
confirmed in its general aspects, meaning in the sense that their definitions of these networks seem to 
be an accurate representation of how they open up new channels of influence by building new links  
among actors, and are – or at least profess to be – characterized more by a focus on values and 
causes  than  by interest,  as  well  as  them being tied  together  by a  common discourse and dense 
exchanges  of  information.  While  they claim that  these  networks  are  characterized  by horizontal 
patterns of communication and exchange (1999:1), the structure of their work seems to be better 
characterized by a top-down process, from the international secretariats down to individual lobbyists. 
This  is  not  to  say that  there  isn't  reciprocity  or  feedback,  but  that  they rely heavily on  central  
coordination to organize their work on strategically framing the debates. Furthermore, due to the 
reliance  of  their  strategies  on  resources  and  broad  membership,  the  secretariats  of  the  bigger 
organizations (AI, IANSA, Oxfam) have more influence than other members of the network. 
It was confirmed that these networks rely on their access to and use of information, and that 
they  place  importance  on  frame  alignment  and  frame  resonance  (Keck  and  Sikkink,  1999:95), 
meaning the rending of events as meaningful guides to action and finding a portrayal of events that 
suits both themselves, internally, and their targets, i.e. states or diplomats. Regarding this strategic 
portrayal, the network seems to have continuously come up with a joint enterprise and a common 
frame of meaning (frame resonance) with regard to themselves and the arena in which they operate, 
though not without difficulty and credibility related issues. In working out this common frame, they 
are  presented  with  the  difficulties  of  the  multiple  NGOs  having  a  different  focus,  as  well  as 
difficulties  with  regard to  their  stated political  neutrality,  being accused of  having closer  ties  to 
particular governments. 
5.2.2 - The typology of political influence, anomalies, new findings
While the typology of Keck and Sikkink – consisting of  information politics,  symbolic  politics, 
accountability  politics  and  leverage  politics  –  proved  a  useful  tool  in  the  analysis  of  political 
influence in this case, it failed to properly account for some central aspect of how the transnational 
advocacy network operated. To understand the nature of their political influence on the international 
level, theory should be able to account for these anomalies and include them in a picture of how non-
state actors work, the conditions under which they can be successful and the extent of their influence. 
It is outside the scope of this project to determine how such a theory would be, or to work out an  
entirely new typology for  political  influence.  By way of  conclusion,  it  will  suffice  to  show the 
implications these anomalies have for current theory on transnational advocacy networks.
A significant  portion  of  the  CAC network's  influence  can  be  understood  as  information 
64
politics,  as  demonstrated  by the  manner  in  which  they  frame  the  issues  and  present  politically 
actionable  information,  both  internally  and  externally.  Maintaining  an  optimal  balance  between 
technical and statistical information and the use of expertice, on the one hand, and the more human 
interest related testimonials on the other, is something the informants in this case emphasize. This is 
analogous to the descriptions in theory.68 Arguably, the cornerstone of their political influence is in 
having a monopoly on certain types of information; they raised the issue, and so states look to them 
for information. While Keck and Sikkink describe this as an important part of a network's influence, 
the case of the ATT indicate that this also hinges on a good relationship with states. Put plainly, they  
can only make good use of this type of influence if they are on speaking terms with key governments,  
which, in turn, tend to preclude the use of antagonistic tactics. Whereas theory puts emphasis on how 
transnational advocacy networks have to maintain credibility with the press, this also holds true on a 
more  diplomatic  level;  they  must  not  appear  to  have  bias  toward  particular  countries,  thereby 
excluding them from others.69 Informants did not seem to be worried about the normative issues 
related to the dramatization of facts, indicating that they did not see this as a problem of credibility. 
The use  of  symbolic  and accountability  politics  are  less  prevalent  in  the  ATT campaign, 
largely for the same reasons as mentioned above. In some of their  reports,  they use events in a 
symbolic fashion to show the consequences of an arms trade that is handled in a privatized fashion, 
without international regulation; there is no juxtaposition of symbolic events in this case that matches 
the examples in theory,70 but rather a myriad of smaller events, suggesting that this is not the core of 
their influence in this matter. Accountability politics are of limited use, according to informants, in 
that states will choose to simply ignore them or otherwise disregard their accusations. In working on 
the ATT, they are naturally very conscious of this phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon of states not 
following  their  international  commitments  and  signed  resolutions,  as  it  relates  to  the 
operationalization stages of the ATT itself and particularly the exact phrasing of the resolution. 
Leverage  politics  are  prevalent,  though  for  the  most  part  in  a  different  manner  than  is 
described by Keck and Sikkink. Informants explain how antagonistic tactics such as moral leverage 
in the form of shaming are, in effect, a double-edged sword. Though they have used such leverage on 
occasion, they prefer to either leave it implied or not to use it in this arena, as naming transgressions 
by particular nations are poorly received in the UN. Instead, they appeal to mutual benefit vis-a-vis 
states,  lending  them credibility  by association  and  being  given  increased  access  in  return.  This 
practice is circular in that for states to benefit from association with the networks, the networks must  
have  a  positive  image  with  states  to  begin  with.  As  with  information  politics,  this  hinges  on 
credibility  and  them  not  being  perceived  as  partial  to  some  countries.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
68 Keck and Sikkink (1999:96), and Manno (1994:106)
69 As shown in 4.2.1 in this paper.  
70 Keck and Sikkink (1999:96)
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informants confirm the notion from theory that leverage is dependent on the vulnerability of the 
country being leveraged; in most cases it must belong to, or aspire to belong to, a normative and 
democratic community of states, as well as be sensitive to international media. When they use the 
form of issue-linkage described in the theory71, it is generally to 1) show that what they are proposing 
is not something new, thereby downplaying the concessions states would have to make, 2) explain 
that it is in a state's interest, in the sense that it will prevent harmful things happening within the 
country and 3) public image, which is the conventional antagonistic type of leverage, where they 
intend to limit that country's influence with other states by isolating it. 
As was shown in chapter four, an important way in which they seek influence over the process is to 
target key countries in a synchronized fashion, simultaneously at the UN and in their capitals. With 
regard to influence in the UN setting, informants describe this as their most important strategy. This 
strategy of attaining political influence is not easily subsumed into the typology, and it does not fit 
with the descriptions of Keck and Sikkink of how transnational advocacy networks work. This is not 
to  say that  it  is  directly  inconsistent;  simply that  it  warrants  an  extension  either  of  types,  or  a 
redefining of what is associated with those types. It was shown in 4.2.4.1 how networks essentially 
mimic states; since it has been their experience that diplomats at the UN will either refer to their 
capitals  for  instructions  –  or  at  least  pretend to  do  so  in  order  to  prevent  getting  "cornered"  –  
networks  ensure that they are represented there as well. Moreover, their lobbyists in capitals are kept 
constantly  informed  on  minute  details  about  the  process,  and  are,  correspondingly,  tasked  with 
keeping the UN lobbyists updated on reactions in capital. 
The benefit of this approach is that states are exhausted of options in terms of evading the 
issue – they can no longer simply say that they are waiting for instructions from their capital. Another 
advantageous result is that this is self-reinforcing. They can use this mechanism as a dynamic way of 
educating the network's staff and increasing their contacts in governments; since the network will 
deploy lobbyists strategically based on regional representation – NGO lobbyists from Kenya will 
ideally be the same ones that are lobbying that country's officials – they can make contacts on-site at 
the UN which will facilitate their access to the capital at a later stage.  
Another way in which they seek to influence the policy is to continuously frame the agenda 
or issue in such a way as to appeal to national interests and creating a system of incentives associated 
with the ATT. While related to both information and leverage politics, this form of issue-linkage is 
multivariate as opposed to singular, and dependent upon a good relationship with states and on good 
channels of information as regards their position. It is debatable whether one should consider it a 
macro-strategy, a distinct type of influence or merely a goal; informants, however, tended to describe 
71 Keck and Sikkink (1999:97)
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it as a strategy. The basic premise of this strategy is that they frame the issue in such a way as to 
convince states that it would be harmful to their financial, strategic and community-based interest if 
they were left outside the fold. This entails creating an image of the ATT as representing something 
beneficial as opposed to restrictive, and as an internal marked bound by the rules of the ATT.  For this 
to be convincing and appealing, however, they must secure some of the more powerful actors as 
parties to the ATT. In order to sway the more powerful actors, their primary strategy is to reshape 
alliances and to induce groups of smaller, more progressive states to influence them on their behalf. 
Some statements by informants indicate that they are willing to concede the speculative nature of this 
approach, owing to the – for them – obscurity of a state's real position and intentions, along with the 
general difficulty of influencing the larger countries in matters that affect their financial interest.  
As an example of the various types of influence described in the above, the introduction of a 
consensus provision by the US gives unique insight into how these networks try to influence policy. 
Specifically,  it  exemplified  how  the  lobbyists  used  by the  CAC network  in  their  synchronized 
advocacy in the UN and capitals are informed on a day-to-day basis on current threats to the goals, 
and how the issue needs to be framed to address those threats. It indicated how they have good 
channels  of  information,  on  the  one  hand,  and  their  selective,  country-specific  use  of  this 
information, on the other. This relates not only to the information that originates with them, but also 
information from governments – such as drafts of the resolution in-progress.     
In  sum,  rather  than  trying  to  force  the  position  of  states  with  conventional  leverage,  the 
networks seem to prefer the access and influence given to them by maintaining good relations. Their 
relationship to the formal actors in this arena is, in a sense, that of playing advisors to the king; this 
enables them to influence actors through reshaping alliances and by reframing the debate in such a 
manner  that  the  ATT seems  profitable,  essentially  putting  the  concept  of  national  interest  in  a 
different context.  While they have a clear and joint set of goals internally,  they are nevertheless 
selective about the information and arguments they use toward  states; using specifically tailored 
arguments on those from whom they want specific things and generally keeping their cards closer to 
the chest. This is evidenced by their internal documents and emphasized by their reluctance to speak 
outside the stated policies of their respective organizations.
5.2.3 - Relevance of case to theory; anomalies, characteristics, stages  
In addition to findings which are incongruent with theoretical descriptions of how non-state actors 
work  to  achieve  political  influence,  the  data  sheds  light  on  issue  and  actor  characteristics.  As 
mentioned earlier, the Control Arms Campaign, along with related work on the ATT, is considered a 
success; while the precise genealogy of the issue is not part of this study, most seem to agree that 
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non-state actors brought this issue up and have shepherded it through preparatory negotiations. They 
have yet to reach the finish line, but it is already clear that the campaign was not a failure from their  
end in that an overwhelming number of countries voted for the resolutions. In terms of evaluating a 
campaign's success, theory on the matter suggests that it lacked the necessary prerequisites in terms 
of issue characteristics; this is echoed by informants, who claim that an international  bureaucratic 
process is hard to sell to the general public, on the one hand, and of a high order of complexity on the 
other. Simply put, the ATT is lacking in issue salience.
Since  this  study  explores  how  they  work  to  achieve  political  influence,  and  has  not 
undertaken any measurement of the extent of their political influence, this matter is hard to gauge; it 
is, however, possible to make some considerations based solely on the nature of their work and the 
campaign in question.  Keck and Sikkink argue that issues pertaining to bodily harm (e.g. violence 
against women) and legal equality of opportunity (e.g. women's suffrage), are especially resonant in 
the international community (1998:205). While an ATT relates to the former in the strictest sense, it 
still  lacks the issue salience of the cases they mention and has more in common with what they 
describe as "irredeemably structural" problems, which are cases that lack a clear causal chain leading 
from a responsible party to a victim (1998:27).72 This suggests that what the case lacked in terms of 
issue characteristics it made up for in actor characteristics. A possible explanation can be found in the 
strength and density of the network,  the effectiveness of the channels of information and in the 
priority on strategies on the level of what informants call direct, high-level lobbying.  
It would seem that the emphasis in theory on dividing regime formation into clearly defined 
stages (Young 1998:2), is a dead-end when applied to the transnational advocacy network analyzed 
in this case. Over all, it is more relevant to talk of different levels of political influence on which they 
are working simultaneously; by way of example, they are constantly trying to frame the issue to  
properly  meet  new  challenges,  corresponding  to  agenda  formation,  regardless  of  whether  these 
challenges originate in the negotiation or operationalization phase. As tools of analysis, stages can 
not account for the way in which transnational advocacy networks structure their campaigning and 
advocacy. While informants were talking specifically about the ATT, it seemed like their preferred 
way of organizing the campaign was to ensure popular mobilization early on, and then to focus more 
on high-level lobbyism once this was secured. But they continuously used tactics relating to both, 
and it does not correspond meaningfully to the stages discussed either in Young's regime theory or 
the NGO-specific theory of Keck and Sikkink. 
In conclusion, while a good portion of the data gathered on political influence in this case are 
congruent with the typology and the description in theory of central concepts, it is not exhaustive of a 
transnational advocacy's options or, indeed, their common practices in the UN arena. The strategies 
72 As mentioned in 2.2.4. 
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and methods  used  to  achieve  political  influence  in  this  case  suggest  that  a  complete  theoretical 
account of transnational advocacy networks, one that aims to be useful for the analysis of NGOs in 
the UN setting, needs to have categories that can more precisely account for these strategies. While it 
is  possible,  for  example,  to  analyse  the synchronized  UN and capital  lobbying,  as  well  as  their 
attempts at creating a system of incentives, in terms of leverage and information politics, the findings 
warrant a different and, at minimum, more inclusive explanation of these types. 
5.3 – Methodological considerations and relevance to field
As mentioned in the chapter on method, this case was chosen on the grounds that it would be a 
paradigmatic example of how NGOs operate as actors in the UN.73 In a way, it is written as a critical 
case, i.e. a black swan, in as much as it deviates from established theory in some aspects. This theory, 
however, makes no pretensions toward absolute universality. The argument here is simply that these 
findings merit inclusion into theory, not that theory on the matter has to be rewritten. A significant 
limitation in this context is the study's reliance on the informants own perception of their NGO's 
influence, which makes it hard to determine the reality behind their assertions and, consequently, 
whether this can truly be considered a paradigmatic example. The general limitations of interviews as 
a source, as discussed in 3.1.2, should be understood as reflected in my findings. The use of internal 
documents help to validate them, but in the end, these come from the same source. On the other 
hand,  the only reasonable way to find out how they work is  to  ask them. If  it  were practically 
possible, one could also interview diplomats at the UN as a control group, but as they are targets of 
this influence and are presumably not familiar with the internal strategy, this would only reflect the 
end-result of their methods and not the whole process. 
As has been stated several times, the goal of this study is not a measurement of the extent of 
political influence, but an analysis of the forms in which it is attempted. An understanding of how 
transnational advocacy networks operate makes a future study of the extent of their influence more 
feasible, as these types can be used in measurement. It is likely, however, that some of these types are 
unique in terms of intrinsically belonging to campaigns being directed at international organizations 
such as the UN, if not unique to the ATT campaign. Hopefully, this analysis has highlighted some 
general  characteristics  of  the  political  dynamic  involved  in  this  and similar  cases.  The  only 
pretension  to  generalization  this  study  makes  are  analytical  generalizations  toward  theory,  as 
described by Yin (1994:36), and the final confirmation on the potential for generalization can only be 
made in future research with a broader scope.        
An account of non-state actors in international relations remains an unexplored issue, whose 
73 (Flyvbjerg, 2006:232)
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relevancy increases along with such phenomena as globalization. Colás, Bas Arts, Keck and Sikkink 
all point to the prevalence of either lacking or misleading theory on the matter; while there has been 
significant research on the interplay between domestic concerns and international change, and vice-
versa,  there is  little  theory in  terms of  international  civil  society's  influence on the international 
arena.74 According to the neorealism of Waltz, non-state actors should be disregarded because when 
'the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate' (1986:89). While the latter 
might be true, it seems that transnational advocacy networks are quite apt at reinventing the language 
in which states talk about the issues. 
Chapter 6 – References 
Arts, B. "  The Political Influence of Global NGOs – Case studies on the Climate and Biodiversity  
Conventions ". (Netherlands, International Books, 1998)
Black, T. "Doing Qualitative Research in the Social Sciences". (London, Sage Publications, 1999) 
Bryman, A. "Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Further Reflections on their Integration". In 
Brannen, Julia (ed). "Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research."  (London. Ashgate, 
2003)
Bryman, A. "Social Research Methods, Second Edition". (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
Colás, A.  "International Civil Society – Social Movements in World Politics".  (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2002)
Corbin,  J.  and  Strauss,  A.  "Basics  of  Qualitative  Research  –  techniques  and  procedures  for  
developing grounded theory". (London, Sage Publications, second edition 1998) 
Flyvbjerg, B. "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research".  In "Qualitative Inquiry", vol. 
12, issue 2, April 2006 (Aalborg, Denmark , Sage Publications,, 2006)
(2010, January) [Online]. Url: http://online.sagepub.com
74 Examples: Bas Arts, 1998:30, Colás 2002:3-4, Keck and Sikkink, 1998:4. 
70
Holliday, A. "Doing and Writing Qualitative Research – second edition" (London, Sage Publications, 
2007)
Hønneland, G. "Methodological Considerations: The case for Cautious Variants of a Positivist and  
an Interpretivist Approach".  In Hønneland, G.  "Compliance in the Barents Sea Fisheries".  (Oslo, 
University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, 2000)
Jackson, R., Sørensen, G. "Introduction to International Relations – Theories and approaches, third  
edition" (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007)
Keck, M., Sikkink, K.  "Activists Beyond Borders – Advocacy Networks in International Politics"  
(New York, Cornell University Press, 1998)
Keck, M., Sikkink, K.  " Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics"  
International Social Science Journal 1999, Volume: 51, Issue: 159, Publisher: Blackwell Synergy, 
Pages: 89-101. (2010, May) [Online]. Url: http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/
Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf 
Manno, J.  "Advocacy and diplomacy: NGOs and the Great Lakes Water  Quality  Agreement".  In 
Princen, T., Finger, M., "Environmental NGOs in World Politics" (London, Routledge, 1994)
Waltz, K. "Political Structures" and "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power", in Keohane, R. (ed.), 
Neorealism  and  its  Critics (New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  1986)  
Waltz, K. "Theory of International Politics" (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979)
Wight,  M.  "International  Theory – The Three Traditions"  (Leicester:  Leicester  University Press, 
1991)
Willetts, P.  "Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics".  In Baylis, J., 
Smith, S. (ed.) "The Globalization of World Politics" (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005)
Yin,  R.  "Case  Study  Research  –  Design  and  Methods,  Second  Edition"  (California,  Sage 
Publications, 1994). 
71
Young, O. " Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance" (New York, Cornell 
University Press, 1998)
Select primary sources
Amnesty International, "Compilation of Global Principles for Arms Transfers", (London, Lynx DPM, 
2007)
IANSA, "Global Week of Action Against Gun Violence" (London, IANSA, 2008)
Amnesty  International,  "How To  Apply  Human Rights  Standards  To  Arms  Transfer  Decisions".  
(London, Amnesty Int. Publications, 2008)
Amnesty International, "Stopping the Terror Trade; how human rights rules in an arms trade treaty  
can help deliver real security". (London, Amnesty Int. Publications, 2009)
Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China – sustaining conflict and human rights abuses".  
(London, Amnesty Int. Publications, 2006)
Amnesty  International,  "An  Effective  Arms  Trade  Treaty:  "The  World  Can't  Wait"".   (2009, 
December) [Online]. Url: http://intranet.amnesty.org/cp/ Document code: (ACT 30/0072009)
United  Nations  General  Assembly,  “Towards  an  Arms  Trade  Treaty:  establishing  common 
international  standards  for  the  import,  export  and  transfer  of  conventional  arms”  (2010,  May) 
[Online].  Url:  http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/499/77/PDF/N0649977.pdf?
OpenElement 
Chapter 7 – Appendix
Interview questions: 
Set 1: Orientation
Question 1.1: Would you like to remain anonymous/fine with tape recorder/read transcript?
Question 1.2: What is your position in NGO x? 
Question 1.3: What are you tasked with doing in relation to the Control Arms Campaign?
Question 1.4: How long have you worked on the Campaign (in what different capacities)?
- Have you participated in setting the agenda for the NGOs lobbying in the UN?
- Have you participated directly or indirectly in campaigning at the UN?
- Have you participated in the research leading up to reports on the matter?
72
Set 2: Agenda formation / Research [if applicable to interviewee]
Question 2.1: Describe how you work to prepare the bigger meetings in the UN.
- How did/does your NGO work in terms of concrete preparations before the bigger    
   meetings in the UN?   
- What are the usual methods used to gain attention for a cause, prior to the UN?
- Is this work centered around the reports? 
Question 2.2: Do you perceive this campaign to be apolitical in nature? 
Question 2.3: Can you describe some of the more common problems you experience in this part of 
the process?  
- Was there much internal disagreement on the development of goals?
- Where there pressures from interest groups outside the NGO?
Question 2.4: What are the typically used solutions to these kinds of problems?
Question 2.5: Are your reports perceived by recipients as pure research, or as activism? 
Question 2.6: Are the NGOs involved united in the goals and expectations from the UN, or do they 
want and/or expect different outcomes? 
Question 2.7: What parties would you say, if any, were the most influential in determining the 
agenda (in terms of goals, priorities, message, methods) prior to presentation at the  
UN? NGO x, y or z. 
Question 2.8: What methods do you perceive as having the most influence? I.e. The reports, media 
activism, direct lobbying toward diplomats, etc.
Set 3: UN – Campaigning / Negotiations / Operationalization [if applicable to interviewee]
Question 3.1: How would you describe your strategies to make causes relevant in the UN? What  
specific methods do you use to get attention in the UN?
- How are reports presented in the UN? I.e. Is it formalized meetings, one-way 
   presentations or debates, etc. 
- Do you have a role in concrete negotiations vis-a-vis the content of a treaty? Do 
   you seek to influence national delegates to talk on your behalf? 
Question 3.2: Can you describe some of the more common problems and challenges you experience 
in this part of the process?  (As NGO or as individual)
- Is there much internal disagreement within the campaign crew, or among the different 
  NGOs, on how to achieve goals in the UN?
- What kind of opposition, if any, do you get from  interests groups / nations /political 
    wings  with different opinions on the treaty?
- How would you describe your strategies toward the US, it being the most influental nation 
   to oppose this treaty? 
- And after they decided to back it, how do you relate to the issue of veto?]
Question 3.3:  What are the typically used solutions to these kinds of problems?
Question 3.4: Will reactions received in the UN-setting have retroactive effect on goals/agenda?
Question 3.5: What are you expectations regarding the outcome of a arms trade treaty? 
- What kind of plans have you made or would you make for the follow up if such a 
   treaty was made, in terms of operationalization and implementation of goals? 
Question 3.6: How do you perceive your NGOs influence in the UN? 
- What would you say were the biggest challenges in terms of getting through?
- Which methods do you consider the most effective in achieving goals in the UN? 
Set 4: Additional information / Corroborating sources
Question 4.1: Is there anything you would like to discuss that you think might be relevant in 
relation to the political influence of NGO x on the UN? 
Question 4.2.: Do you have any documents that might be relevant to my study?
Question 4.3: Do you think NGO x should have a formal position in the UN? 
Question 4.4: Do you have any good advice regarding further data collection (webpages, so forth)?
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